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D.S. MIRSKY:
THE DEATH OF A MODERNIST
Greta N. Slobin
D. S. Mirsky: A Russian Life, 1890-1939 
By G. S. Smith
Oxford University Press, 2001. Clothbound. $110.00.
P
rince Dimitry Sviatopolk-Mirsky was an 
extraordinary man who exemplified the 
contradictions of his time. Bom in 1890, he 
was a contemporary of the great poets of the 
Russian renaissance, the so-called Silver Age: 
Pasternak, Akhmatova, Mandelstam, and 
Tsvetaeva. A prince turned Communist, an emigre 
who despised his exiled compatriots, a 
cosmopolitan and a Eurasian nationalist, who was 
a failed poet (his book of verse published in 1911 
was panned by Gumilev), but a brilliant literary 
critic, Mirsky brought Russian literature to the 
English public in a history text that remained 
definitive from the time it appeared to the end of 
the twentieth century. Comprising two volumes that 
were later abridged in one, his Contemporary 
Russian Literature, 1881-1925 (1926) and History 
ofRussian Literature from the Earliest Times to the 
Death of Dostoevsky (1881) (1927), were translated 
into German, Italian, and French. They remained 
largely inaccessible to his compatriots until 1992, 
when a Russian translation was published in 
London. Neither the history, nor his trenchant 
essays published in English or Russian during the 
decade in emigration seem to have come from the 
same pen as some of his hack writing after the 
return to the USSR in 1932. A believing 
Communist, Mirsky wrote politically correct 
criticism in his native country, but this did not 
protect him from sharing the tragic fate of his 
contemporaries, including Osip Mandelstam—arrest
in 1937 and death in the same labor camp in 
Magadan in 1939.
The long-awaited magisterial biography D. S. 
Mirsky: A Russian -English Life, 1890-1939 by G. 
S. Smith (Oxford, 2001) is the authoritative study 
of this key and controversial figure in Russian 
letters. Smith takes up the challenge of 
understanding the complex and enigmatic man who 
happened to live and actively participate in Russia’s 
“terrible years.” His declaration of purpose is direct 
and understated: “There is no detailed account of 
what Mirsky did and where he did it, much less a 
sustained enquiry into why and how he did it” 
(xvii). The author’s approach amply demonstrates 
that it would be impossible to understand Mirsky, 
an idiosyncratic individual who often puzzled and 
unnerved his contemporaries, without delving into 
specific circumstances of his time.
Smith interviewed important personal friends 
and people who knew Mirsky before his return. 
Although much of Mirsky’s correspondence had 
been lost, the complete series of his letters to 
Dorothy Galton and P. P. Suvchinsky constituted 
an important source of biographical information, 
along with the NKVD files on Mirsky’s arrest 
which became accessible after 1991. His personal 
papers confiscated upon arrest appear to have been 
lost. Smith posits the critical questions in his 
project; he makes every possible effort to dispel the 
ambiguities and controversies associated with 
Mirsky, the myths surrounding his private life, his 
political activity in Europe, and the circumstances
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leading to his return to Soviet Russia, undertaken 
despite his better judgment and considerable 
knowledge of the conditions there.
As an aristocrat from one of Russia’s oldest 
family lines, Mirsky received a superior humanist 
education at home and in the renowned Tenishev 
gymnasium. Already as a young student, he 
gravitated towards the artistic bohemian culture, 
especially the poetic and homosexual circles of pre­
revolutionary Petersburg associated with Mikhail 
Kuzmin. The chapter titled “Two Callings” 
describes Mirsky’s further schooling, academic and 
military. In 1908 he entered St. Petersburg 
University and participated in Professor Semen 
Vengerov’s Pushkin seminar, where the first 
generation of professional Pushkinists was trained, 
along with the future Formalists. During his three 
years at the University, Mirsky also studied Oriental 
languages. Without completing his course of study, 
he joined the army in 1911 and as a member of the 
Imperial Guards regiment he enjoyed the high 
society life of the capital. He returned to the 
University in 1913, but rejoined his regiment when 
war was declared, and continued active military 
service through the Civil War, escaping via the 
southern route in 1920.
Mirsky came to England in 1921 with the 
assistance of Maurice Baring, who knew and visited 
the family before the Revolution, and began 
teaching at the University of London. He soon 
became a prominent intellectual. As an elite 
cosmopolitan exile with independent views, he was 
prominent in British literary society. As his Russian 
criticism shows, he was less than fond of the 
Russian intelligentsia and its self-appointed role as 
traditional guardian of the people and national 
culture. The facts of Mirsky’s early biography help 
explain his particular position in Russian letters and 
the reasons why he did not identify with either the 
raznochintsy of the Russian intelligentsia in his 
homeland, or those in emigration. He analyzed 
literary history from a Russian but also a 
cosmopolitan perspective (hence the appropriately 
hyphenated title of the biography), which enabled 
him at one and the same time to act on behalf of, 
but also to counteract, his native culture and its 
intellectual traditions.
Smith justly attests that “of the Russian 
intellectuals of his generation, very few could match 
his knowledge of Western European languages and 
cultures, but there was nobody else of any stature 
who combined this knowledge with an awareness of
the cultures of Asia based on first-hand linguistic 
study” (47). Smith sheds light on Mirsky’s 
“particular and unique position in Russian letters” 
as a man of inordinate talent and training. Like his 
contemporary Formalists, who were his classmates 
in the Vengerov seminar, he was modem and 
innovative in his approach to literary study, yet he 
was not an academic but “a practical critic with a 
primary interest in current literary events” (50). Just 
how extraordinary Mirsky’s achievement was can 
be surmised if we compare his concise and 
groundbreaking history of Contemporary Russian 
Literature: 1881-1925 to that edited by his 
university teacher, Semen Vengerov, whose 
ponderous History of Twentieth-Century Russian 
Literature, published in 1914, represents the first 
attempt to describe and make sense of the various 
trends in Russian modernism and its “motley 
disorder” (pestryi besporiadok). 1 It is worthy of 
note that future histories of the Silver Age would 
not be forthcoming until the publication of a 
collective seven-volume project of twentieth- 
century Russian literary history in France in 1986.2
Smith is careful to distinguish the successive 
periods in Mirsky’s life as they coincide with 
turning points in Russian history. He considers the 
implications of the fact that Mirsky identified with 
the post-Symbolist generation of Gumilev and 
Kuzmin, whom Mirsky describes as belonging to 
the “second generation of ‘modernists’ ... more 
bohemian than bourgeois.” As their younger 
contemporary, Mirsky also became a witness and a 
first serious chronicler of their significance in 
literary history. This is in sharp contrast with the 
tensions that mark the creative biography of 
Vladislav Khodasevich, who was conscious of 
having been born “between generations,” thus 
neither a Symbolist nor an Acmeist.
In his later study, Russia: A Social History 
(London, 1931), Mirsky characterized his 
generation as “free from the fin-de-siecle
1. S. A. Vengerov, ed. Russkaia literatura XX veka, 1890- 
1910 (Moscow, 1914-1916.), 2 vols.
2. Histoire de la litterature Russe. Le XXe Siecle, edited by 
Efim Etkind, Georges Nivat, Ilia Serman and Vittorio Strada 
(Paris, 1987). The Russian translation of the Silver Age 
(Serebrianyi vek) volume was published in 1995. This was a 
pioneering effort, encompassing Russian emigre and Soviet 
material, whose comprehensive view Mirsky would have 
applauded. The only other study to follow Mirsky, almost 70 
years later, was British Slavist Avril Pyman’s superb book, 
A History of Russian Symbolism, published in 1994.
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aestheticism and, for the most part, from all ideas 
and philosophies.” Smith extrapolates convincingly 
that these “freedoms” constituted “the basis of that 
liberal and humanitarian agnosticism that among 
other things enabled Mirsky to write, in emigration, 
a history of Russian literature that lasted so many 
years” (57). Smith also suggests that Mirsky “came 
to believe that, in clearing away the enthusiams and 
false gods of the preceding generation, he and his 
contemporaries had left a vacuum at the centre...” 
(58). This vacuum, as Smith concludes here and 
demonstrates later in the book, prompted Mirsky to 
construct his Marxism in the late 1920s.
Mirsky’s unique background prepared him to 
represent Russian modernism to the West as an 
equal in the Western context, which usually 
assumes Europe to be the center. Poised as he was 
between the two worlds, a true Russian at home in 
Europe and Asia, Mirsky was a cosmopolitan in the 
best sense of the term. He was able to understand 
the historical Russian ambivalence at being sitnated 
between the east and the west that formed the core 
of Andrei Bely’s Petersburg (1911-1913), a 
representative novel of Russian modernism that has 
been compared to James Joyce’s Ulysses. Unlike 
Bely, Mirsky regarded Russia’s position between 
the two worlds as a strength, rather than a tragic 
split. Hence writing about Russian modernism 
whose achievement, if anything, was on the par 
with the best in Europe, was also close to the heart 
of Mirsky, the Eurasianist.
Understandably, Smith devotes a considerable 
part of the biography to Mirsky’s emigre years, 
since they comprised a decade of intense and 
prolific critical activity, conducted in English, 
French and Russian language publications. While 
teaching at the University of London, Mirsky wrote 
for the London Mercury, the Slavonic Review, and 
The Times Literary Supplement, and was 
instrumental in bringing contemporary Russian 
literature to the attention of the British public. As an 
active contributor to major emigre publications, 
Mirsky strove at once to bridge the gap between his 
conservative readers and European modernism, as 
well as its dynamic Soviet counterpart. His was a 
virtuoso polemical performance, whose clear 
critical vision strikes the reader to this day.
Scholars of the Russian diaspora note the 
relatively fluid borders that allowed travel and 
contact between the young Soviet Union and the 
European centers of emigration in Prague, Berlin,
and Paris? The separation between the homeland 
and Russia Abroad occurred with political shifts in 
the Soviet Union in 1925, when a quest for the self­
definition of the diaspora began in earnest, with 
such questions as “There or Here?” and “One or 
Two Literatures,” posed by one of its leading poets 
and critics, Vladislav Khodasevich. This is when 
conservative cultural politics of the diaspora began 
to define its role as that of preservation of national 
tradition and its great literature, threatened in the 
land of the Bolsheviks.
In their utmost concern for aesthetic standards 
as an assurance of literary continuity, both Mirsky 
and Khodasevich argued against emigre 
conservatism and for the necessity of artistic 
innovation independent from politics. For example, 
both had championed Marina Tsvetaeva since 1925 
as the greatest poet in emigration and wrote 
insightful criticism of her work that remains 
valuable to this day. Both argued with the emigre 
denial of Soviet literature for political reasons. 
However, Mirsky’s ungenerous appraisal of 
Khodasevich as a poet led to bitterness and, as 
Smith remarks, “the spectacle of the two most 
gifted critical minds of the emigration tearing at 
each other ... is one of the most dismal in the 
unhappy story of Russia Abroad” (154).
Indeed, Mirsky’s responses to the questions 
posed by Khodasevich were categorical and swift. 
Russia Abroad was the periphery and not the center 
of cultural activity, which was located in Soviet 
Russia, where dynamic social change was 
underway. It is useful for the reader to understand 
that Mirsky’s consistent defense of modernism is 
carried out in the context of modernity—the 
declared thrust of revolutionary Soviet society of 
the time—and this approach remained steady in his 
critical writing through the late twenties. His 
important polemical essays on the subject appeared 
in the two issues of the Belgian journal, 
Blagonamerennyi, published in 1926, which also 
featured Remizov and Tsvetaeva. The first issue of 
the journal opened with Mirsky’s programmatic 
statement that the reason for the journal's 
appearance was “to insist on the right of literary 
criticism to judge on the basis of literary merit.” In 
writing “O sostoianii nyneshnei russkoi literatury” 
(On the Current State of Russian Literature), Mirsky
3. See: Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the 
Russian Emigration (New York, 1990).
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challenges both the Soviet and emigre critics: “To 
approach literature with political criteria, as do The 
Russian Times, Resurrection, Red Virgin Soil, and 
Zinaida Gippius is, of course, nonsensical, and not 
only for literary reasons, but for political ones as 
well.”'’ However, Mirsky takes a sharp turn with a 
clear challenge to the emigres as he asserts that 
“Russian literature finds more joie de vivre after 
the Revolution, then it did before it.” Among the 
best writers living in the Soviet Union Mirsky 
singles out Mandelstam, Pasternak, and Babel, 
referring to them as “inorodtsy," using the official 
term designating foreign nationals in the Russian 
Empire (here Jewish), thus signaling the 
cosmopolitanism of Russian literature.
In his razor-sharp piece “On Conservatism. A 
Dialogue,” which appears in the second issue of the 
journal, Mirsky derides the emigre literary 
conservator, proclaiming that “restoration iij 
literature is as impossible as it is in politics ...” 
He questions whether a Russian “who love^ the 
national culture, ought to be a literary and national 
conservator.” He responds in the negative that 
“there is nothing to conserve.” Instead, Mirsky 
stresses the importance of the “literary process and 
its “ceaseless dynamic,” asserting that “restoration 
exists neither in politics, nor in culture” and that 
“art is a creation of new values.”6 In this statement, 
Mirsky places himself squarely on the side of the 
literary avant-garde and the Formalist critics in the 
USSR. A year earlier he had written what remains 
one of the best accounts of the formative period of 
Formalist theorizing (1922-1924) in Sovremennye 
zapiski (1925). One can see how Mirsky attempts 
to educate and prod his reader to appreciate the 
difficult modernist literature and ends with the 
ironic statement that “Pasternak and Marina 
Tsvetaeva may not be immediately appreciated, but 
I also have to make an effort to get to the British 
Museum from my house.”7
The most provocative gesture that year was 
Mirsky’s lecture on “The Ambience of Death in 
Pre-revolutionary Russian Literature,” delivered 
before a Parisian emigre audience. Here Mirsky 
denied the value of the pre-revolutionary cultural
4. “O nyneshnem sostoianii russkoi literatury,” in Uncollected 
i'/ritings on Russian Literature (Berkeley, 1989), p. 226.
5. Blagonamerennyi, no. 2 (1926): 90.
6. Ibid., 87.
7. Ibid., 92.
renaissance, pronouncing it as imbued with a sense 
of death and decomposition, symptomatic of the 
decline of the empire. This argument concluded 
with the ominously ponderous statement that “for 
a quarter of a century our literature (and not just 
literature) has been preparing us for death” (quoted 
in Smith, 135). This position galled his 
contemporaries in the audience: Merezhkovsky, 
Berdyaev, and Khodasevich left the lecture without 
engaging in a discussion. Along with them, the 
reader is left to wonder what could lead Mirsky to 
contradict his own championing of Russian 
modernism and the poetic achievements of his 
generation in Contemporary Russian Literature, 
1881-1925, published that same year, except 
perhaps to redirect the attention of his peers, 
“blinded by political rage,” to look at the brilliant 
writing in the young Soviet Union.
In this context it would have been of interest to 
note that Mirsky was also in disagreement with 
another contemporary, V. Ivanov-Razumnik, a 
prominent pre-revolutionary critic who remained in 
Soviet Russia and whose edited collection of 
essays, titled Russkaia literatura. Sbornik statei, 
was published in Leningrad in 1925 with difficulty 
and without his name.8 In his introduction to the 
volume, Ivanov-Razumnik proclaimed this as a 
proper moment for a “look back” at the past, since 
“a critical appraisal of the immediate past is alone 
capable of explaining the phenomena of today and 
mapping out the plausible path of tomorrow.” 9
In the essay titled “Vzgliad i nechto” (A Glance 
and Something), published under the pseudonym of 
Ippolit Udush’ev, he draws a line between the 
earlier period of modernism whose achievements in 
the first quarter of the century were, in his 
judgment, so superb as to be considered the Golden 
Age, followed by the inevitable decline already in 
the present and in the near future.10 There is no 
mention of this book in the biography and it would 
be fascinating to know whether Mirsky had read it 
before his talk. Moreover, Mirsky’s controversial 
stance would be counteracted in the early thirties 
by the emigre poets and critics who would launch a
8. Aleksandr Lavrov and John Malmstad, “Preduvedomlenie 
k perepiske,” Andrei Bely i Ivanov-Razumnik: Perepiska. 
Publication, introduction and commentary by A. V. Lavrov 
and J. Malmstad (St. Petersburg, 1998), p. 22.
9. Ibid., p. 161.




campaign to assert the great poetic and cultural 
achievements of the so-called Silver Age, thus 
rescuing it from oblivion.
This dynamic phase of Mirsky’s life included 
his promising and at times brilliant Eurasian 
journal Versty, a controversial publishing venture 
of great historical importance, which ended in 
frustration over the finances and logistics of 
producing such a journal. In following the tortuous 
history of Mirsky’s work on the journal, Smith 
relies on his correspondence withP. P. Suvchinsky, 
a Eurasianist and a fellow member of the editorial 
board, along with S. Efron. As chief editor of the 
journal, Mirsky sought to establish a venue for 
exploring new directions in literature. His editorial 
statement in the first issue in 1926 registers a 
rather ambitious vision for the journal that is worth 
noting here. He insists on the primacy of artistic 
over political values (which dominate Soviet as well 
as emigre publications), aiming to publish the best. 
He also proclaims the aims of the journal to be 
cosmopolitan, reaching beyond the narrow Russian 
interests to the European context (surprising for an 
Eurasian journal), a stance similar to the one taken 
by Sovremennyi zapad (1922-1924), edited by 
Komei Chukovsky and Evgeny Zamyatin, two 
prominent Anglophiles on the Soviet scene, at 
whose request Mirsky contributed an article on 
contemporary English poetry in 1923. The journal 
published contemporary Soviet literature as well as 
translations of Western modernists, along with 
regular reviews of the emigre publications. The 
short life of this journal and the fact that LEF had 
ceased publication in 1926, led Mirsky to envision 
a journal that would fill the vacuum existing in 
Russia abroad, except for Volia Rossia, which he 
considered the most vital journal in emigration.
Although Mirsky wrote that Versty could not 
pretend to “unite all of the best and the most alive 
(vsego, chto est’ luchshego i samogo zhivogo) in 
contemporary Russia literature, to do so selectively 
was clearly his intent. A journal published abroad, 
however, could point the emigre reader’s attention 
in that direction, stating that this would be easier to 
realize from “the outside” or “the periphery” (so 
storony could be understood as either) than in 
Russia. While emphasizing the journal’s 
cosmopolitan modernity, Mirsky also made a 
“supranational” argument. He points out that what 
is “Russian is greater than Russia itself’ (russkoe 
bol’she samoi Rossii), and shows how he perceived 
and delineated the possibilities for a dynamic
literary life at the time. However, he also equates 
this russianness with “modernity” or 
“contemporaneity” (sovremennost') as its 
“particular and most acute expression” (osoboe i 
naibolee ostroe vyrazhenie).11 The emphasis on 
sovremennost ’ recalls the position of the foremost 
Soviet literary journal, Red Virgin Soil. Along with 
Soviet writers, the first issue of Versty featured his 
two favorite authors, Marina Tsvetaeva and 
Aleksei Remizov, who remained the sole 
representatives of emigre literature on its pages.
Not surprisingly, the first issue of Versty was 
greeted by a negative response from both sides of 
the border. Khodasevich wrote an indignant review 
in Contemporary Notes with allegations of 
pandering to the Soviets and not acknowledging the 
difficulties writers faced there, but also of 
denigrating the terrible conditions of writers in 
emigration.12 Unbeknownst to Khodasevich, 
dismissal of the first issue was delivered on the 
Soviet side by M. Arseniev, Political Editor of the 
Leningrad branch of Soviet censorship (Glavlit): 
“The entire collection is saturated with an anti- 
Soviet tendency and with hatred for the Bolsheviks” 
(quoted in Smith, 155). While Smith does not 
mention whether Mirsky knew about this directly 
(although Arsen’ev’s judgment was found among 
Suvchinsky’s papers), he was certainly aware that 
Versty was unacceptable in the homeland, since no 
subscription for it was forthcoming. The double 
jeopardy in which the daring endeavor had found 
itself confirms Khodasevich’s diagnosis of the state 
of Russian literature in 1925 as “ailing both here 
and there,” a fact which Mirsky seemed unable to 
accept.13
In keeping with Mirsky’s vision, the second 
issue issue of Versty contained superb selections of 
contemporary Soviet prose, such as Tynianov’s 
historical novel, Kiukhlia, Artem Vesely’s 
Insurrection, and Andrei Bely’s Moscow under the 
Hammer. Translation of important Western 
criticism, Forster’s Aspects of the Novel, as well as 
Mirsky’s review of T.S. Eliot’s Poems, 1905-1925 
were also included. The publication of Rozanov’s
11. D. S. Mirsky, Versty, no. I (1926): 1.
12. V. Khodasevich, “O Verstakh.” Sovremennye zapiski, no. 
29(1926): 433-441.
13. “Tam ili zdes’?” Dili, no. 804 (25 September 1925); Rpt. 




The Apocalypse of Our Time with its attacks on 
Socialism and Commmunism in the literary 
supplement of the 1927 issue leads Smith to 
conclude that Mirsky could “only have been flirting 
with Communism at the time” (158).
Concerning the journal’s Eurasianist position, 
Smith remarks that ”if the first issue of Vyorsts had 
not been in any real sense ‘Eurasian’ except for the 
formal association with the name of Suvchinsky, the 
contents of the second and third have a much 
stronger connection with the movement” (159). He 
cites a striking passage from an earlier letter to 
Suvchinsky that sheds light on Mirsky’s attitude 
towards both Eurasianism and politics. In his 
response to a request for an article on August 11, 
1923, Mirsky admits that he is “so lacking in 
seriousness that he’s Eurasian in even years and a 
European in odd ones. In general, though, I am a 
man without convictions and a born (though not 
always open) enemy of ideas in general ... (142).
Smith devotes considerable attention to the 
Eurasianists, since their activity was couched in 
mystery and surrounded by suspicion of 
collaboration with the Soviets. He clarifies the 
situation concerning Tsvetaeva’s husband, Sergei 
Efron, because of whose justly suspected work as a 
Soviet agent, Tsvetaeva was ostracized by the 
emigre community prior to her own return to the 
Soviet Union. An informed discussion of these 
matters and of the political expression of the group 
in the newspaper Eurasia, to which Mirsky 
contributed some journalistic pieces, sheds light on 
the various political views within the group and on 
its disintegration by 1929, which contributed to 
Mirsky’s decision to go east. And in 1929, when the 
newspaper Eurasia came to an end, Mirsky wrote: 
“My ‘materialist’ heart rebelled against this so- 
called ‘reason’ which held it prisoner for nearly a 
quarter of a century ... I had made contact with 
Marx” (quoted in Smith, 163). In a fascinating and 
detailed discussion of Eurasianism and its pro- 
Soviet politics, Smith discusses Mirsky’s 
contribution in the newspaper Eurasia that 
eventually led to a schism in the movement: 
“Mirsky essentially redefines Eurasianism in the 
spirit of his nascent Marxism ...” and renders the 
movement superfluous (179).
As Smith suggests, by seeking a way out of the 
“vacuum” of his generation, Mirsky moves from his 
identification as a modernist to that of a 
Communist, following his meeting with 
Mayakovsky, the leading poet of the left avant-
garde who visited Paris in 1928. However, this 
identification, expressed in Mirsky’s obituary essay 
“Dve smerti” (Two Deaths), and written shortly 
after Mayakovsky’s tragic suicide in 1930, seems 
a strategic move rather than an expression of the 
deep connection which he had with the second- 
generation modernists, whose aesthetics of refined 
and cultivated rebellion were much closer to him. 
In his 1926 essay “On the Present State of Russian 
Literature,” cited earlier, Mirsky singled out the 
great living Russian poets Akhmatova, Pasternak, 
Mandelstam, and Tsvetaeva, but saw Mayakovsky 
as someone who was past his prime and no longer 
creative. In “Dve smerti,” Mirsky proclaims that 
Mayakovsky’s suicide marked the end of the age of 
the individual artist, a product of bourgeois society, 
even though the poet was on the side of the 
Revolution. Mirsky states that the objective reason 
for Mayakovsky’s suicide was a realization that his 
kind of art is not needed in the Soviet land. Mirsky 
does not adumbrate on specific reasons for this 
situation, clearly reluctant to enter the dynamics of 
cultural politics of the First Five-Year Plan, though 
he never misses an opportunity to do so on the 
emigre side. Instead, he submits the poet to 
“uncompromising Marxist categories” (188) and the 
harsh judgment of history, to which he would in 
turn be submitted before the decade was over.
It would be fair to conclude that despite his 
usual critical acuity, Mirsky did not address the 
myth of the Russian poet as Roman Jakobson had, 
nor of the revolutionary poet as the French 
Surrealists would, considering the poet’s suicide as 
the ultimate act of transgression.14 Nor did Mirsky 
comprehend Mayakovsky’s real importance as a 
representative poet of Soviet modernity and its 
contradictions, about which Marina Tsvetaeva 
wrote so eloquently.15 Their close friendship and 
subsequent disagreements form another “sad page” 
of emigre literary history that Smith features in the 
biography. Although Smith does not state so 
specifically, as a poet-critic Tsvetaeva becomes 
another serious interlocutor, who, along with 
Khodasevich, would continue to argue with
14. For an excellent account of the Russian and French 
interpretations of the myth of the poet, see Svetlana Boym, 
“The Death of the Revolutionary Poet” in her Death in 




Mirsky’s assessments in the early thirties. 
Tsvetaeva provides an excellent counterbalance to 
Mirsky in her stunning essay “Poet and Time,’ 
published in 1932, two years after his obituary “Dve 
smerti.”
In this context it is fascinating to recreate the 
turning point in their thinking as it parallels literary 
history and read the two essays side by side as a 
dialogue that strikes the nerve of the epoch. As 
Mirsky considers the predicament of the poet in 
history, his juxtaposition of Pushkin, the 
nineteenth-century Russian national poet whose 
death also marked the end of an era, and of 
Mayakovsky, the Soviet poet, was itself an 
anathema for the conservative emigre guardians of 
classical Russian culture. Taking up Mirsky’s 
arguments concerning the relationship of 
modernism and modernity, Tsvetaeva opens her 
essay with a quote that seems to continue his 
“Dialogue. On Conservatism,” with a typical 
statement of an average emigre reader that both 
scorn: “I really love art, but only not contemporary” 
and the counter-statement: “I love verse, but only 
contemporary.”15 6 She follows Mirsky in the 
juxtaposition of Pushkin and Mayakovsky, but to 
very different ends. In recognizing the fact that 
“history is inescapable” (iz istorii ne vyskochish’), 
Tsvetaeva argues for poetry as a supratemporal art, 
declaring that “there is not art ... that is not 
contemporary” (ne sovremennogo ... iskusstva 
net).17 She is in concord with both Mirsky and 
Khodasevich, stating that “restoration is not art,” 
but in a retort to Mirsky she extolls the artistic 
individual talent as being “beyond time” (yne- 
vremennyi). She proclaims that “contemporaneity” 
is not her time and argues that the 
“contemporariness” of a poet is not in in the 
contents of the verse, but often despite it—in its 
sound. She declares the “marriage of poet and 
time—a forced marriage.”18
In this polemical statement on aesthetic 
modernism, Tsvetaeva draws a timely distinction 
between its representative “revolutionary poet” and 
the “poet of the revolution” (chantre de la 
revolution), who champions modernity. In declaring 
Mayakovsky a unique poet who exemplified both,
Tsvetaeva appears more attuned to the challenges of 
modernity that she and her poetic 
peers—Mayakovsky, Akhmatova, Mandelstam, 
Pasternak, and Khodasevich—were facing on both 
sides of the border. She is in agreement with the 
latter’s essay, ‘'Literatura v izgnanii” (Literature in 
Exile), published the following year, which affirms 
the validity of poetry in exile, with such precedents 
as Dante, the Polish Romantic poets, and the poets 
of the Hebrew renaissance. Like Tsvetaeva, 
Khodasevich proclaimed the art of poetry to be 
beyond the social and political demands of its time, 
and outside territorial boundaries. In his assertion 
that national literature “is created by its language 
and spirit, and not the territory where it dwells, nor 
by the life it reflects,” Khodasevich reiterates the 
principle of separation of national culture from the 
state, thus entering a larger conversation on the 
predicament of exile in the twentieth century.19 By 
this time, however, Mirsky was in the Soviet Union, 
literally beyond reach and beyond modernism, as he 
turned to Marxism with characteristic passion and 
single-mindedness.
If we consider the sum of Mirsky’s intense 
dialogue with his prominent compatriots in the 
diaspora, it becomes clear that his mission was to 
shake up the conservative emigre attitude, while 
seeking connections with the homeland he 
considered essential. This period of sustained 
literary activity and Mirsky’s critical position 
provides one of the many possible reasons for his 
return which Smith explores at length. If we look at 
the body of Mirsky’s work up until his departure, it 
affords significant insight into his views on literary 
modernity and their implications for the problems 
of ideology (Marxism) and nationalism in relation 
to literature at home and abroad. Many of his 
statements ring true today as Russian literature is 
being reconsidered in its totality by both Western 
and native scholars. His views appear in a new light 
in current reconsiderations of Russian literary and 
cultural history at the end of the twentieth century,
15. M. Tsvetaeva, “Poet i vremia,” Izbrannaiaproza v dvukh 




19. See Erich Auerbach, “Philology and Weltliteratur.” 
Translated with an introduction by E. Said,. The Centennial 
Review, vol. 13 (1969): 17.
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but also in the context of recent critical discussions 
of modernism in the West.20
In documenting events leading to Mirsky’s 
decision, Smith sheds light on Gorky’s role. 
Mirsky’s assertion of not being “a man of ideas,” 
his choice of publications in Versty, his defense of 
esthetics apart from politics, all demonstrate his 
independence of judgment, which remained intact 
during his meeting with Gorky when he went to 
Sorrento with Suvchinsky during the Christmas 
vacation of 1927-1928. Smith shows from Mirsky’s 
skeptical response to Gorky’s invitation to return to 
Russia that he had no illusions about Gorky’s 
personality or his politics. Nor did he harbor 
illusions about how he and others like him would be 
regarded by Soviet authorities. However, Mirsky 
thought the meeting with Gorky important in 
recounting his intellectual development after joining 
the Communist Party in 1931 as “the first contact 
with ‘the other side of the barricade’ and our first 
breath of pure materialist air...” (quoted in Smith, 
166). Smith surmises that Mirsky probably thought 
of going to Russia on a visit just as Gorky had been 
able to do, when he informed him of his decision to 
return in 1929.
For the next couple of years Mirsky is engaged 
in Communist Party work in England, making 
speeches at rallies and writing for the Labour 
Monthly, edited by Palme Dutt. Smith notes that the 
first of the articles presented Soviet Dialectical 
Materialism to the British Left. Mirsky’s 
contemporary, the prominent Italian Communist, 
Antonio Gramsci, then in Mussolini’s prison, was 
impressed with his intelligent analysis and deemed 
it “worthy of study.”21
Thus, the end of Eurasianism, compounded with 
personal disappointments, and conflicts with 
university colleagues, particularly Bernard Pares, 
all contribute to Mirsky’s decision. In a chapter 
pointedly titled “Why Mirsky Went Back,” Smith 
quotes the impression of the preeminent writer of 
the Bloomsbury group, Virginia Woolf, who upon
20. For discussions of modernism and modernity, see Marshall 
Berman, All That Is Modern Melts Into Air (New York, 1983); 
Hal Foster, ed. The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern 
Culture (Port Townsend, 1983); Andreas Hyussen, After the 
Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism 
(Bloomington, 1986).
21. Gramsci’s Prison Letters, translated and introduced by 
Hamish Hamilton (London, 1988), 154.
saying good-bye to Mirsky thought that “soon 
there’ll be a bullet through your head. That’s one of 
the results of the war, this trapped cabin’d man” 
(quoted in Smith, 209). Baffled by this decision, 
contemporaries cited various reasons. Lavrin 
thought of Mirsky’s patriotism, while Gleb Struve 
saw this irresponsible action as another mischievous 
prank and the result of his “instinctive 
unconformism” (quoted in Smith, 210). Smith also 
makes it quite clear that Mirsky did not want to be 
on the periphery, but in the center—in fact, for him 
the periphery was not only Russia Abroad, but all of 
bourgeois Europe with its retrogade politics, 
economic depression and the spectre of another 
world war looming ahead. Smith astutely considers 
Mirsky’s departure as logical in the general sense 
of crisis in the West, when many European and 
British intellectuals turned to the Left, concluding 
that “Mirsky seems to have been able to live with 
inescapable contradiction between Marxist 
determinism and godless post-Nietzschean willed 
forging of destiny” (211).
The last part of the biography, “Back in Russia, 
1932- 1939,” is a triptych, where each striking title 
represents the successive stages in the last period of 
Mirsky’s life. In “The Rising Line,” Smith’s cogent 
account offers considerable insight into the day-to- 
day political infighting and the resulting jostling in 
the literary cultural institutions of the thirties. A 
rational man and a convinced Marxist, such as 
Mirsky, could not have foreseen or imagined the 
extent of Stalin’s irrational schemes. Mirsky was a 
man out of step with the times as the new 
generation of men in their thirties formed the new 
power elite, while he became increasingly isolated, 
although he continued to work intensively up until 
his arrest.
Smith painstakingly amasses the available 
documents, personal accounts (he notes how those 
living in the West who knew Mirsky were much 
more willing to speak about him than the Russians), 
and published sources that have emerged since the 
perestroika period through the nineties, in order to 
compose the pieces that constitute the narrative of 
the turbulent years between the First Writer’s 
Congress in 1934 and Mirsky’s arrest in 1937. 
During this time Mirsky attends meetings at the 
Writers’ Union and is an active contributor to the 
literary press, and as Smith notes, “his industry was 
if anything more remarkable once he got started in 
Russia than it had been in England,” so that the five 
Soviet years account for a quarter of his total
5
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publications (252). Although the larger history of 
this period is familiar, the unfolding of this 
particular story acquires extraordinary pathos and 
suspense as Smith masterfully leads the reader 
through each literary scandal or misstep in Mirsky’s 
critical activity, when going in the wrong direction 
or after the wrong person at this time of officially 
sanctioned cannibalism spelled distaster. Such, for 
example, was the story of Mirsky’s 1934 review of 
Aleksandr Fadeev’s novel, The Last of the Udege, 
which he panned as unworthy of a Soviet writer, 
when Fadeev was already ensconced in Stalin’s 
entourage.
Gorky watched over Mirsky as he had promised 
when they met in Sorrento and came to Mirsky’s 
defense on many occasions. He was responsible not 
only for Mirsky’s work on publications in the 
Foreign Literature series, but also for his 
participation as part of the writers’ contingent sent 
to the grand construction sites, such as the White 
Sea Canal and History of the Factories. Smith cites 
one witness account which attests to “Mirsky’s lack 
of sensitivity to his own position in his new 
surroundings ...” (248). As part of a writer’s group 
visiting the canal site after its completion in 1933, 
Mirsky asked strikingly provocative questions about 
the conditions leading to the swift completion of the 
construction and the unpaid labor of prisoners, all 
shrouded in secrecy. On this occasion, “Mirsky’s 
insistent questioning made the assembled writers 
feel awkward” (247).
At this time, Mirsky’s critical activity was 
adamantly Marxist. While in Leningrad in 1933 he 
participated in the discussion of the Academy’s 
Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House) on 
eighteenth-century Russian literature and publishes 
his “most doctrinaire” essay on the subject. In his 
essay on “The Problem of Pushkin,” which appears 
later that year in Literary Heritage, Mirsky 
critiques recent scholarship and comments on its 
“national narrowness”: “We do not have a single 
history of a pan-European literature that includes 
Russian literature, nor a history of Russian literature 
that sees it as part of European literature” (quoted in 
Smith, 260).
As Smith demonstrates in “The Falling Line” 
chapter, Mirsky’s situation began to worsen in 1935 
as writers became subject to closer scrutiny. In his 
presentation at the II Plenum, whose main topic of 
discussion was literary criticism, Mirsky defended 
the critics as more cultured than the writers and was 
attacked in turn. In 1935 he wrote two survey
articles about Soviet poetry published during the 
previous year, stating that the non-Russian poets 
were the best as represented in the translations by 
Tikhonov and Pasternak, with whom he was in 
contact and writes about. He did not mention either 
Akhmatova nor Mandelstam, whose first arrest 
came in that year.
Mirsky himself becomes a prominent target on 
the Moscow literary front. Neither Mirsky ’ s Marxist 
approach to Western literature (he wrote on James 
Joyce, T.S. Eliot and modem British poetry), nor 
his Marxist but cosmopolitan approach to Pushkin, 
whom he saw as a poet representative of his class 
considered in the European context, were “in step” 
with the Stalinist thirties. Ironically, the Pushkin 
essay “soon became a pretext of near high treason” 
(260). Mirsky’s days were numbered and he 
showed signs of distress and depression to the 
occasional visiting Brit who met him in the 
Natsional restaurant, which Mirsky frequented on 
occasion to indulge the habits of his former life—a 
taste for excellent food and drink.
Although Smith is primarily concerned with the 
Russian Mirsky in the bulk of the biography, it is 
ironic that in these final chapters we find out more 
about Mirsky’s attitude to the British literary culture 
of his time through his writing on it in the Soviet 
Union, especially his strident critique of The 
Intelligentsia of Great Britain (1935), translated by 
Alec Brown, whose publication caused a sensation 
in Britain. With the collaboration of Leningrad’s 
best translators, Mirsky edited the anthology 
Contemporary British Poetry {Antologiia novoi 
angliiskoi poezii), a major publishing project for the 
times. The project was nearing completion in 1937, 
when Mirsky was arrested. His name was deleted 
and the name of one of the contributors was used 
instead when the volume appeared in 1937. It 
remained the best such anthology for decades to 
come: Joseph Brodsky learned about W.H. Auden 
from it as a young man.
Smith painstakingly reconstructs the story of 
Mirsky’s arrest and time in the camps in the last 
chapter, “The End of the Line,” through recourse 
to the available NKVD files that include the 
transcription of the interrogations. However, the 
extreme bureaucracy of the dfferent KGB agencies 
makes it nearly impossible to obtain and coordinate 
various reports and, as Smith attests, “the story of 
his case is incomplete in many respects. Only an 
unrestricted investigation of the KGB archives, 
more than the work of one lifetime, would enable
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the full story to be told and set in its proper context” 
(304).
In retrospect, Mirsky’s contribution appears 
extraordinary. If we consider the sum of Mirsky’s 
intense dialogue with his prominent compatriots in 
the diaspora, it becomes clear that his mission was 
to shake up the conservative emigre attitude, while 
seeking connections with the homeland he 
considered essential. This period of sustained 
literary activity and Mirsky’s critical position 
provides one of the many possible reasons for his 
return which Smith explores at length. Mirsky 
remained close to the utopian left avant-garde even 
after its demise, especially if we consider the terms 
in which he envisioned the modern, where artistic 
modernism and social and political “progress” went 
hand in hand. No doubt this was one of the reasons 
that propelled him to return to the Soviet Union, 
where he sought a social reality more attuned to his 
idealist Marxist thinking. Despite his ideological 
position, his literary judgments retained an affinity 
with the younger modernists with whom he had 
identified and whom he admired. Along with some 
of the best members of his generation, Mirsky 
became dispensable, a part of the dystopian history 
of these turbulent times.
Despite radical changes of ideology before and 
after his return to the Soviet Union, Mirsky’s 
approach to literature and his aesthetic 
pronouncements retained astonishing integrity. In 
one of his public lectures in Britain in 1923, he 
spoke to the Bronte Society at Leeds about the 
sisters not only as English writers but, along with 
Shakespeare, as belonging to the world at large 
(quoted in Smith, 95). As we can see from this talk 
and his Pushkin essay, written in the Soviet Union 
ten years later, his cosmopolitan perspective on 
national literature had not changed. If we look at 
the body of Mirsky’s work as a whole, it affords 
significant insight into his views on literary 
modernity and their implications for the problems 
of ideology (Marxism) and nationalism in relation 
to literature at home and abroad. His approach 
appears in a new light in current reconsiderations 
by Russian and Western scholars of Russian literary 
and cultural history at the end of the twentieth 
century.
He makes an invaluable posthumous 
contribution to recent critical discussions of 
modernism and modernity in the West. In 
retrospect, Mirsky remained supremely “out of 
step” with the times he lived in, but he was actually
ahead of his time in considering literature not as a 
narrowly defined national entity, but in terms of 
belonging to the world.
As an extended social and cultural history of the 
period before and more then two decades after the 
October Revolution, this landmark study 
encompasses the history of the Russian diaspora 
and of Stalin’s Cultural Revolution of the thirties. 
This trenchant biography of a remarkable cultural 
figure will become an indispensable work for 
scholars of twentieth-century Russian and Soviet 
literature and culture.
Greta Slobin (University of California, Santa Cruz) 
is the author of Remizov’s Fictions, 1900-1921 
(Northern Illinois University Press). Her recent 
article “The ‘Homecoming’ of the First Wave 
Diaspora and Its Cultural Legacy” appeared in the 
Summer 2001 issue of Slavic Review.
10
MUDDLING ALONG:
THE FIRST DECADE OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE
Taras Kuzio
T
he aim of this article is twofold. First, to 
outline a general framework for the study of 
post-Soviet Ukraine that draws on my study of 
developments in different areas over the last decade. 
Ukraine became an independent state in January 
1992 with historical baggage from empire and 
totalitarianism. Of the 27 post-communist countries 
those with the lightest burdens of legacy from 
empire and totalitarianism have produced a more 
successful transition.1
This baggage has shaped a path dependency in a 
country divided into roughly three equal camps: active 
national democrats (often mistakenly referred to as 
“nationalists”) who form the basis of civil society, a 
passive center that draws upon those with an 
amorphous identity and former national communists 
turned oligarchs, and Ukraine’s largest political party, 
as well as an unreformed Communist Party of Ukraine 
(KPU). This path dependency and the resultant 
threefold division of political forces has produced a 
relatively stable environment in Ukraine, where none 
of these three political forces are able to dominate the 
country and impose their will. Breakthroughs in 
reform, along the lines of Central-Eastern Europe, 
were therefore impossible (and, by implication, so 
was a complete return to the past, as in neighboring 
Belarus). Domestic and foreign policies maintain 
Ukraine along a “muddling way” within a virtual 
polity where declared and actual policies are very 
different.2 Ukraine’s “muddle way” has meant that 
Ukraine has never outlined a concrete goal or 
domestic or international vision of what it is building
or where it is heading. Indeed, President Leonid 
Kuchma hoped that a Ukrainian scholarly conference 
in Summer 2001 would provide him with these 
answers, seven years after first being elected.
The national aspects of Ukraine’s path 
dependency have played the decisive role in 
determining two further outcomes? Ukraine’s 
inherited legacy within the national domain produced 
a country lying midway between denationalized 
Belarus and the highly nationally conscious three 
Baltic states. This has influenced such questions as 
support for current borders, the weakness of 
separatism, a close correlation between national 
identity and civil society and an amorphous 
“pragmatic center,” which acts as a buffer between 
national democrats and communists. Ukraine’s path 
dependency has helped to facilitate a delegative 
democracy where Russophones and Sovietophiles, 
who although living in the most populous regions of 
eastern and southern Ukraine, largely do not 
participate in civil society and whose main 
participation in the political process occurs only 
during elections. As a consequence of this political 
configuration, Ukraine’s elites can ignore national 
democrats during elections and Russophones and 
Sovietophiles between elections.
In this article I will survey this path dependency 
in two domestic areas to test the framework. These 
two areas are political and economic reform as well as 
state- and nation-building. Foreign and defense 
policies are referred to in the article within the context 
of domestic policies but to do them justice would 
require a separate article.3 4
1. See Alexander J.Motyl, “Ten Years After the Soviet Collapse: 
Persistence of the Past and Prospects for the Future,” in Adrian 
Karatnycky, A.Motyl and Amanda Schnetzer, eds., Nations in 
Transit 2001. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East 
Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (New Brunswick, 
NJ and New York: Transaction Publishers and Freedom House, 
2001), 36-44.
2. See Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Muddle Way,” Current 
History, vol.97, no.620 (October 1998), 342-46, D. Arel, 
“Kuchmagate and the Demise of Ukraine's ‘Geopolitical Bluff” and 
Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine's New Virtual Politics,” East European 
Constitutional Review, vol. 10, nos. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), 54- 
66.
3. See Philip G. Roeder, “Peoples and States after 1989: The 
Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions,” Slavic 
Review, vol.58, no.4 (Winter 1999), 854-81 and Taras Kuzio, 
“Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?” 
Politics, vol.21, no.3 (September 2001), 168-77.
4. See Jennifer Moroney, Taras Kuzio and Mikhail Molchanov, 
Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy (Westport: CT: Praeger, 
forthcoming 2002).0ther bibliographic sources on Ukrainian 




Twin Legacies and Path Dependency
The legacies of empire and totalitarianism 
fundamentally affect the national question in 
Ukraine. Due to this legacy the national idea in 
Ukraine was strong enough to propel the country to 
independence but insufficiently powerful to become 
hegemonic in post-Soviet Ukraine. The national idea 
in Ukraine is influenced by these twin legacies in 
three areas.
First, the link between nationalism and 
modernization, which has always, as Ernest Gellner 
reminded us, been strong since the late eighteenth 
century and remains so in modernizing states in 
South East Asia today, was broken in eastern 
Ukraine. Until the 1920s nationalism and 
modernization were allowed to develop 
simultaneously in Soviet Ukraine because of the 
policies of indigenization and national communism. 
After Soviet leader Josef Stalin consolidated his 
power these twin policies were dropped in favor of a 
fusion of Soviet communism and Russian great 
power chauvinism that masqueraded as 
“internationalism.”
These policies lasted for five decades (from the 
mid 1930s to the mid 1980s), creating an urban and 
industrialized population with a territorial attachment 
to Soviet Ukraine and, in some cases to the USSR, 
but with few cultural or linguistic links to Ukrainian 
culture and language. Among this element of the 
population only two of the three political groups that 
dominate Ukrainian politics have been successful in 
winning their support—centrists (dominated by 
former national communists turned oligarchs) and 
the left.5
These legacies have influenced the inability of 
KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) to evolve into a 
national communist or social-democratic, 
derzhavnyk, political party as elsewhere in Central- 
Eastern Europe. After the national communists 
(Leonid Kravchuk) and economic elites (Leonid 
Kuchma) of the KPU defected to the national 
democrats, the rump KPU remained disorganized 
and illegal. It was finally permitted to establish a 
new KPU in October 1993 that consisted of the hard­
line minority “imperial communists” from the pre- 
August 1991 KPU.
The KPU has always commanded a large number 
of seats in the Ukrainian Parliament, its only source 
of influence in Ukrainian politics, ranging from 80 in 
the 1994-1998 Rada to 120 in 1998-2002. The only 
occasion when they were absent from the Rada, due 
to their illegal status, was in 1992-1993. During this 
period the Rada under President Kravchuk and 
Prime Minister Kuchma could have ostensibly 
introduced radical reforms, but the fact that they did 
not is due to the reasons outlined in this framework. 
At that time the former national communists were 
even more unclear about any program of action or 
where they were taking the country (Kuchma asked 
the Rada this very question in despair), they had no 
political parties to represent their interests, the 
eastern Ukrainian wing of this establishment had 
still to decide whether it was financially worthwhile 
to be derzhavnyky and if they introduced reform 
policies which failed they would have had no KPU- 
dominated Rada on which to deflect blame.
Since 1994, when economic and political reforms 
began, Kuchma has constantly attacked the Rada for 
blocking his reform plans. This has been a 
commonly used excuse throughout the CIS and has 
been used by the executive as an argument to 
weaken parliamentary power at the expense of the 
presidency. Undoubtedly, the KPU has been a more 
vociferous critic of reform than the Communist 
parties of Central and Eastern Europe who, having 
become social democrats, have usually embraced 
reform (Serbia and Croatia, of course, until 2000 
represented exceptions). Nevertheless, by 
continually blaming others for Ukraine’s problems 
the executive follows the Soviet tradition of refusing 
to accept responsibility for problems that should be 
clearly laid at the feet of the head of state.
Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2001 report 
clearly does not point to parliamentarianism as an 
obstacle to reform in Central Eastern Europe, where 
it is more prevalent.6 In the CIS, where 
presidentialism is prevalent, reform has not 
progressed faster but has regressed. The April 2000 
referendum organized by the executive to reduce the 
powers of the Rada by introducing a smaller number 
of deputies, two houses and removing immunity 
from deputies would have eroded Ukraine’s 
democratization even further. It was not 
implemented because “Kuchmagate” destroyed the
5. I discuss this legacy in my “Ukraine: Coming to Terms with the
Soviet Legacy,” The Journal of Communist Studies & Transition 
Politics, vol. 14, no.4 (December 1998), 1-27. 6. Available at www.freedomhouse.org.
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unity of the non-left majority in the Rada later that 
year.7
Democratization, the role of political parties and 
influence of civil society have regressed since the 
late 1990s in the CIS, including Ukraine,8 corruption 
and patronage have increased, and the independent 
media have come under attack. To blame the KPU 
for blocking reforms is, therefore, not to see the 
forest for the trees. By the end of the post-Soviet 
decade the former national communists-oligarchs 
had become the main threat to democratization in 
Ukraine, not the KPU. Those on the moderate left, 
such as Oleksandr Moroz and his Socialist Party 
(SPU), have supported the anti-oligarch-Kuchma 
opposition by accusing Kuchma of threatening both 
democratization and statehood.
This growing cleavage between the centrist 
oligarch camp and national democrats and their pro­
statehood left allies came abruptly onto the 
Ukrainian political scene in 2000-2001, when 
“Kuchmagate” exposed the true nature of the 
Kuchma regime. Ironically, the KPU refused to join 
the anti-Kuchma opposition and at times even 
supported the oligarch camp in the Rada, leading to 
accusations that they have been bought by the 
executive. This has broadened the rift between the 
anti-statehood KPU and the pro-statehood SPU.9
The second legacy is that national democrats, 
unlike their Baltic counterparts, have been unable to 
take power in Ukraine. Ironically, the Soviet regime 
strengthened an already powerfully entrenched 
national idea in western Ukraine, nurtured by the 
Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian empire prior 
to 1918 (at a time when the Tsarist empire was doing 
its best to eradicate the Ukrainian national idea, 
including the single ban on any language in the 
empire, namely, Ukrainian). After the Jews were 
murdered and Poles ethnically cleansed the small 
number of urban centers in western Ukraine after 
1945 were filled with Ukrainians. Nationalism and 
modernization of the region went hand in hand as
7. See A. Karalnycky, “Meltdown in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, 
vol.80, no.3 (May-June 2001), 73-86.
8. S. Birch, “Nomenklatura Democratization: Parly Formation and 
Electoral Clientelism in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” Democratization, 
vol.4, no.4 (Winter 1997), pp.40-63 and Paul Kubicek, “The Limits 
of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine,” Democratization, vol.8, no.2 
(Summer 2001), 117-39.
9. See O. Haran and O. Majboroda, Ukraiinski Lvivi: Mizh
Leninizmom i Sotsial-Demokratieiu (Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy,
2000).
russification measures were relatively relaxed in 
comparison to those in western Belarus, also 
annexed from Poland.10
Ukrainians were not only the largest ethnic group 
proportionately among Soviet dissidents, but also a 
proportionately large number of them came from 
western Ukraine itself. Two-thirds of the parishes of 
the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet era were 
to be found in Ukraine and three-quarters of these 
were in Galicia, reflecting a close link between 
nationalism and religion, higher than that found in 
Russia. With this historical legacy it is little wonder 
that western Ukraine led the nationalist movement 
against Soviet rule between 1988 and 1991 and 
today still dominates the anti-oligarch and anti- 
Kuchma camp which it accuses of having “hijacked” 
their successful push for sovereignty and 
monopolized and corrupted the derzhava.
This weakness of the national idea was 
celebrated by many Western scholars, policy makers 
and the media in the mid 1990s, because they feared 
that the “nationalizing policies” of what they 
negatively termed “nationalists” would lead to civil 
war between Russians and Ukrainians or 
Russophones and Ukrainophones.11 This view did 
not define nationalism in the broad sense of the term 
as able to lead to positive or negative outcomes, 
depending on the manner in which it was applied 
and defined. Ethnic conflict did indeed break out 
with the assistance of Russian covert operations in 
two post-Soviet states (Georgia and Azerbaijan), 
where national democrats came to power. In the 
three Baltic states, where national democrats also 
came to power, no ethnic conflict has taken place.
10. Roman Szporluk, “West Ukraine and West Belarussia: 
Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic 
Assimilation,” Soviet Studies, vol.31, no.l (January 1979), 76-98.
11. See A. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A 
Minority Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1997), D. 
Arel, “Ukraine—The Temptation of the Nationalising State,” in V. 
Tismaneanu, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and 
the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 
157-88, and David Laitin, Identity in Formation. The Russian- 
Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998). For alternative views see T. Kuzio, 
Ukraine. State and Nation Building. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), T. Kuzio, “'Nationalising States or Nation 
Building: A Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical 
Evidence,” Nations and Nationalism, vol.7, part 2 (April 2001), 
135-54 and Eduard Ponarin, “The Prospects of Assimilation of the 
Russophone Populations in Estonia and Ukraine: A Reaction to 




There is no evidence to support the supposition that 
had national democrats come to power in Ukraine 
the country would have gone the Trans-Caucasian 
route rather than the Baltic one, particularly in the 
light of the lack of religious or ethnic hostility 
between Russians and Ukrainians.
In Central-Eastern Europe regimes changed as a 
consequence of “collective non-violent civic 
action...,” produced by mass movements 
campaigning on nationalist and democratic 
platforms.12 National democrats were only able to 
push Ukraine towards independence with the 
assistance of the national communists,' which meant 
that both sides had to compromise.13 The national 
communists, who were de-ideologized products of 
the Leonid Brezhnev era of stagnation, successfully 
transformed their political power into economic 
influence in the second half of the 1990s. Former 
Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko pointed out, 
“We had a clear political orientation prior to 
independence (when national democrats dominated 
the agenda) and none after independence (when 
former national communists-future oligarchs took 
over).”14
The mistake of Western scholars was always to 
assume that centrist oligarchs possessed any interest 
in national questions or that they were disinterested 
in state independence, in which they had a strong 
raison d’etre to legitimize their defection from the 
anti-independence KPU.15 Nation-building policies 
(historiography, symbols and, to a lesser extent, 
language and culture) were delegated to the national 
democrats, while they acted as border guards to 
ensure that policies in sensitive areas such as 
language remained evolutionary and thereby did not 
upset the Russophone constituency.16
12. A. Karatnycky, “Nations in Transit: Emerging Dynamics of 
Change,” in op cit., A.Karatnycky, A.Motyl and A.Schnetzer, 17.
13. Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence (London: Hurst 
and Co, 1999) and T.Kuzio, Ukraine. Perestreoika to Independence, 
2d ed. (London and New York: Macmillan and St.Martin’s Press, 
2000).
14. Tserkalo Tyzhnia, 28 April-4 May 2001.
15. This point is made by P.D’Anieri, Economic Interdependence 
in Ukrainian-Russian Relations (New York: New York State 
University Press, 1999).
16. The leader of the United Social Democrats, Viktor Medvedchuk,
has openly talked of how his father’s links to the Ukrainian 
nationalist underground led to his family being deported to Siberia
in the 1940s, where he was bom.
The former national communists-oligarchs were 
willing to delegate these areas because they had 
nothing to offer in place of national symbols or 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s historiography. Soviet 
nationality policies had also instilled a commonly 
accepted view that “Ukraine” was the homeland of a 
titular nation—ethnic Ukrainians—and non- 
Ukrainians, who together comprised the civic nation. 
An independent state needed a “state language”; 
otherwise, it would go the way of de-nationalized 
Belarus. There was little opposition to learning or 
reviving one’s Ukrainian to become, or return to 
being, bilingual (the major criticism has not come 
from domestic groups but externally from Russia 
itself).
In turn, the national communists-oligarchs have 
been—and remain—distrustful of Russia, which 
was reinforced when Russia supported Sovietophile 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka over Kuchma- 
type Trade Union leader and opposition leader 
Uladzimir Hancharyk in the September 2001 
elections.17 This has meant that they have agreed 
with their national democratic colleagues that 
Ukraine needs to maintain the CIS at a distance and 
use “strategic partnerships” with the U.S. and NATO 
to deflect Russian proposals for integration.
As Karatnycky has pointed out, how the 
communist system collapsed and what followed 
very much depended on the “strength of the national 
idea.” The fact that the national democrats could not 
take power because they were unpopular in eastern 
Ukraine has allowed the national communists to 
become oligarchs by preventing elite turnover and 
fundamental regime change. A history of past 
failures at achieving independence18 and the 
precariousness of national democratic support, 
which has averaged only between one-quarter and 
one-third of popular support, has led to a vocal 
constituency in both Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
diaspora who prioritize the derzhava, agreeing to 
keep reform on the back burner in the interests of 
state-building. Meanwhile, they turn a blind eye to 
corruption in order to “induce” the former Soviet 
Ukrainian elite to continue supporting statehood and
17. See T. Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-building in Ukraine: 
Defining the ‘Other,’” Ethnicities, vol.l, no.3 (December 2001), 
343-65.
18. In any one year Ukraine could celebrate three “independence 
days”: 22 January (1918), 30 June (1941) and 24 August (1991). 
The official holiday is the latter.
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not sign another Periaslav treaty with Russia.19 
Alternative arguments are made that corruption is no 
worse than in the Soviet era.20
The collection of policies promoted by the 
national democrats, which consisted of political and 
economic reform, de-sovietization and integration 
with Europe, and which are being successfully 
implemented in the three Baltic states, could not, 
therefore, be implemented in Ukraine. Instead, 
Ukraine went the “muddle way,” which was 
characterized by an unwillingness to break fully with 
the Soviet past or its geopolitical space and the 
perversion—but never negation—of the very terms 
“democratization” and “market economy.”
The third legacy in Ukraine was that upwards of 
one-third of the population lies outside either the 
KPU or the national democratic camps. They are 
likely to live outside western Ukraine and are maybe 
either Russophone or bilingual. Not supportive of the 
programmatic “package” offered by the national 
democrats, they have also been unwilling-despite a 
decade of socio-economic crisis-to support a return 
to the past and hence have not voted for the KPU.
Initially, genuine centrist political parties such as 
the Ukrainian Social Democrats attempted to gain 
support among this segment of the population. But, 
they failed and these genuine centrist parties then 
gradually moved into the national democratic and 
anti-oligarch-Kuchma camps. In their place 
“independents” have been traditionally elected in 
districts where Russophones and Sovietophiles 
predominate, while the KPU has been successful in 
wining seats on the party lists.21 “Independents” have 
created top-down centrist parties (e.g., Labor 
Ukraine and Regions of Ukraine), captured genuine 
centrist parties (the Greens, United Social Democrats 
and Peoples Democrats), defected from a left party
19. In 1654 Ukraine and Muscovy, as Russia was then called, signed 
the Periaslav Treaty which Russians and Soviet historiography and 
nationality policy proclaimed to be the “reunion” of two peoples but 
which Ukrainians see as leading to centuries of Russian rule and the 
loss of a ruling elite. See Serhii Plokhy, “The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: 
Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era,” Europe- 
Asia Studies, vol. 53., no. 3 (May 2001), 489-505.
20. Interview with Professor Roman Szporluk in The Ukrainian 
Weekly, 26 August 2001.
21. In the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections 50 percent of
deputies were elected in majoritarian districts and 50 percent on 
party lists. In the 1994 elections 100 percent of the seats were 
elected according to majoritarian principles. Party lists are preferred 
by ideological groups (the KPU and National Democrats) whereas 
the centrist oligarchs prefer majoritarian elections.
(the Peasants) to a new one (the Agrarians) or 
created a completely fake party after evolving from 
organized crime boss into presidential advisor 
(Oleksandr Volkov and his Democratic Union). Not 
surprisingly, these parties have little to do with what 
their titles claim (protection of the environment, 
defense of regions and labor or promoting 
democracy). They are regionally based (Agrarians in 
Galicia, Labor Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk, Regions 
of Ukraine in Donetsk, United Social Democrats in 
Kyiv) and therefore usually represent regional 
“parties of power” (Labor Ukraine and Regions of 
Ukraine took over from Hromada and the Liberals as 
the “parties of power” with links to state patronage 
and “administrative resources” in Dnipropetrovsk 
and the Donbas).
More importantly, they represent the de- 
ideologized spectrum of Ukraine’s political groups. 
Only the national democrats and the left have 
concrete ideological programs that represent polar 
opposites-a complete break with the Soviet past 
through reform and integration with Europe and 
Trans-Atlantic (i.e., the EU and NATO) structures or 
a total return to the former USSR. The national 
democrats look to the Baltic states and Central- 
Eastern Europe, while the KPU looks to Belarus 
(KPU leader Petro Symonenko endorsed 
Lukashenko in the 2001 Belarusian elections).
The de-ideologized centrists lack any ideology 
and are unable to develop a vision for the country 
they lead because they are products of the Soviet 
past who cannot fully escape its twin legacies.22 
Therefore, they have positioned themselves midway 
between both of their ideological competitors 
through alliances with each side at different times. 
Yulia Tymoshenko, head of the anti-Kuchma Front 
for National Salvation (FNS) bloc, explained the 
lack of ideology and directionless state of Ukraine as 
follows:
Leonid Danylovych (Kuchma) simply acts 
without any kind of strategy. All his 
policies are based upon tactical 
manoeuvers. Kuchma continually moves 
from one dead end to another. At one 
moment he is convinced that an orientation 
towards Moscow is better. The vector of
22. See F.M.Rudych et al., Politychni Struktury ta Protsesy v 




Ukraine’s (foreign) policy immediately 
turns towards the East. In a month 
everything changes. He turns to the 
West...23
“Pragmatic” domestic policies are promoted as a 
centrist alternative to “romantic” national 
democratic and restorationist KPU policies that are 
sometimes defined as a “third way” or the 
“Ukrainian way.” These seek to combine policies 
that do not completely reverse the Soviet legacy 
(e.g., in the language domain), while ensuring that 
non-transparent economic reform inordinately 
benefits the former Soviet Ukrainian ruling elite.
In the foreign policy arena this has manifested 
itself in a “multi-vector” foreign policy that is 
deliberately vague so as to be able to adapt to short­
term geopolitical changes. Because domestic policies 
in political and economic reform are insufficiently 
radical and overly corrupt to allow Ukraine’s 
integration into Europe, its declared foreign policy 
strategic goals remain impossible to fulfill. Ukraine 
is no longer portrayed as an anti-Russian “buffer” 
but as a “bridge” that links Eurasia and Europe. 
Although being a “buffer” has its drawbacks, it at 
least placed Kravchuk’s Ukraine firmly on one side 
of the divide within Europe, whereas a “bridge” 
situates Kuchma’s Ukraine with one foot in Europe 
and the other in Eurasia, constantly wavering 
between both poles.
Ukraine’s European partners constantly ask 
Ukraine’s leaders to demonstrate their “readiness” to 
promote its “European choice.” But this has proven 
to be impossible. Ukraine’s oligarchic centrists have 
close economic, and often corrupt, ties to Russia and 
the CIS, particularly through barter and the re-sale of 
energy. “Consequently, both economic and political 
interests of these groups are associated with Russia 
rather than the West.”24
This path dependency, which has been 
convenient for the centrists and Kuchma who have 
played off the KPU and national democrats, may be 
changing because of one personality, Viktor 
Yushchenko. Yushchenko, an eastern Ukrainian 
married to a Ukrainian-American, was prime 
minister for eighteen months, during which time he
was probably the first head of government who 
thought more about the country than enhancing or 
creating a personal fortune.25 Again, this logically 
followed from his patriotic, national democratic 
leanings. In thinking more about the country at large 
at a time of economic upturn he was able to pay 
salaries and pensions which had often gone unpaid 
for months at a time under his predecessors.
A non-corruptible prime minister has become 
Ukraine’s first ever popular politician. This has 
dispelled the notion that Ukrainians do not trust 
politicians and institutions because they do not 
support democratic politics. The real reason was far 
simpler and more telling. Until Yushchenko came on 
the scene Ukrainians believed that people only went 
into politics to enrich themselves and did not care 
about the welfare of the population at large. Seeing 
that this was not the case with Yushchenko, the 
population has given him extraordinarily high 
popularity ratings of 50-60 percent in a country 
where politicians regularly receive only single-digit 
figures. Although he has never hidden his links to 
national democratic parties, Yushchenko’s 
popularity ratings show that when the national 
democratic programmatic package is offered by a 
non-corrupt leader who is also interested in socio­
economic issues (and not only nation- and state­
building), then there will be support for him.
This phenomenon, therefore, threatens both the 
centrists, who can no longer claim to defend eastern 
Ukrainians from “nationalist” western Ukrainians, as 
well as the KPU, whose voters always represented a 
mix of hard-line nostalgic communists and those 
voting for the communists as a protest vote. 
(Opinion polls have constantly shown that 
Ukrainians would like to return to the certainties of 
the low prices and paid salaries of the Soviet era, 
while valuing the move away from totalitarianism 
towards democratization.)
Democratization and Economic 
Reform
Ukraine’s last decade can be divided into two 
halves. Whereas the first half saw progress in
23. Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 17 April 2001.
24. “Opportunities and Obstacles of the Road of Ukraine to NATO,”
Occasional Report 25 (August 2001), Center for Peace, Conversion 
and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.
25. The editor of Ukraine’s respected weekly, Tserkalo Tyzhnia (2-8 
June 2001), Yulia Mostovaya, sees employees in the Presidential 
Administration as only following “greed and discrediting materials 
against their rivals” with no interest in the fate of the state as a 
whole. The president meanwhile, is “completely directionless.”
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democratization, this regressed from 1997 onwards 
as the Kuchma regime entrenched itself in a stronger, 
corporatist state. Although two parliamentary 
elections in 1994 and 1998 and presidential elections 
in 1994 were largely pronounced to be “free and 
fair” by international observers, the 1999 presidential 
elections reflected the tendency towards democratic 
regression already evident in other areas.26 *This 
regression was also evident in the April 2000 
referendum, which was ignored by international 
organizations and has been pronounced as not having 
been conducted in a “free and fair” manner. The 
“Kuchmagate” tapes revealed the presence of 
widespread malpractice in the 1999 elections and the 
2000 referendum orchestrated by Kuchma.
Kuchma is in a dilemma over the 2002 
parliamentary elections, because he has been put on 
notice by the West who will be carefully monitoring 
them. Nonetheless, he is primarily concerned about 
his personal immunity from prosecution when his 
term in office ends in 2004. A large opposition 
presence in the Rada might lead to the launch of 
impeachment proceedings against him or, at the very 
least, an unwillingness to grant him immunity from 
prosecution after he leaves office.
The first half of the 1990s witnessed a growth in 
independent media, a solidification of civil society 
and political parties, and advances across a broad 
front of democratization. In 1996 and 1998 the 
Ukrainian and Crimean constitutions were adopted, 
which signaled the impossibility of going back to the 
Soviet era and an end to any debate as to the 
peninsula’s status. The adoption of the parliamentary 
variant of Ukraine’s constitution by the Rada 
represented a defeat for Kuchma who had always 
wanted to introduce a Russian-style presidential 
system. In 1998 Soviet passports also became illegal.
During the second half of the decade Ukraine 
evolved into an authoritarian, coiporatist state. 
Analyzing opposition to these trends we find that our 
framework correctly predicts that while the centrists 
largely supported the consolidation of corporatism 
the only groups to oppose the executive and support 
democratization and economic reform were-and 
remain-the very people that Western scholars have 
been quick to castigate as “nationalists,” namely, 
the national democrats.
26. Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine
(London: Macmillan, 2000).
Moroz’s SPU, which supports the anti-Kuchma 
opposition on a platform of statehood and 
democracy, represents the only exception, whereas 
the KPU have remained suspiciously quiet. During 
the “Kuchmagate” crisis in Winter-Spring 2000- 
2001 it was the national democrats, emboldened by 
Yushchenko as Prime Minister, who demonstrated 
in support of democracy and created the first serious 
threat to Kuchma’s presidency. The national 
democrats were able to halt Kuchma’s plans to take 
Ukraine down the Belarusian-Central Asian 
authoritarian paths but were insufficiently strong to 
remove him in a national-democratic revolution , as 
in Serbia.
The second half of the decade witnessed a 
confusing picture. In the external policy domain 
Ukraine increasingly proclaimed its foreign policy 
goals as “returning to Europe,” especially under 
Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk from 1998 to 2000; 
Tarasiuk now stands in opposition to Kuchma and is 
allied with Yushchenko. In the domestic arena 
democratization regressed and economic reform 
stalled and stagnated. Domestic and foreign policies 
were clearly not coordinated. The Committee to 
Protect Journalists and Reporters without Frontiers 
condemned Ukraine’s repressive policies towards 
the independent media. The failure to this day to 
carry out a thorough investigation of the death of 
Georgii Gongadze, the journalist kidnapped in 
September 2000 and found murdered two months 
later, nearly led to the suspension of Ukraine’s 
membership in the Council of Europe in 2001.
The Security Service (SBU) under Leonid 
Derkach, whose son is a leading member of the 
Dnipropetrovsk-based Labor Ukraine oligarchic 
group, resurrected some of its old KGB activities 
(e.g., political surveillance of anti-regime opponents) 
together with the Tax Administration, and both 
institutions took part in corruption. It was during the 
late 1990s that SBU Major Melnychenko, who 
worked in counter-surveillance in the President’s 
office, witnessed these negative tendencies at first 
and utilized Soviet-era bugging equipment (the 
Presidential Administration is located in the building 
of the former Central Committee of the KPU) to 
transcribe 300 hours of taped conversations by 
Kuchma with his associates that revealed a wide 
range of illegal activities. Kuchma has never denied 
the authenticity of the tapes, but has claimed that 
different segments of his conversations were edited 
together to incriminate him. Melnychenko defected
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to the United States in April 2001 after living in 
hiding for six months in Europe.
In 1994 Kuchma came to power arguing that he 
would resolve the economic crisis that had worsened 
in Ukraine under his predecessor, especially after the 
hyper-inflation of 1993. A relatively radical and 
reformist program (Ukraine’s first) was launched in 
October 1994. Money flowed into Ukraine from 
international financial organizations after Ukraine 
agreed to surrender nuclear weapons, which it did in 
June 1996.
Kuchma’s reform program had mixed results. It 
succeeded in speeding up privatization but failed to 
lead to structural reform and the creation of more 
efficient enterprises. Monetary reform in 1996 led to 
the introduction of the new currency, the hryvnia, 
which has done relatively well, considering the state 
of the Ukrainian economy. Inflation was also 
brought under tighter control through monetary 
stabilization. Nevertheless, Kuchma’s promise of 
ending the economic crisis only occurred in 2000, 
when the economy began to grow for the first time in 
a decade. Whether this growth is sustainable with an 
oligarchic elite mainly interested in exporting 
capital, not investing, concerned with short-term 
profits and asset stripping is open to doubt.27
Corruption grew at an alarming rate—Ukraine 
was ranked 87"' out of 90 countries by Transparency 
International in its corruption league. Upon coming 
to power in 1994 Kuchma promised to reduce the 
size of the shadow economy but has failed. In 
January 2001 the Secretary of the National Security 
and Defense Council, Yevhen Marchuk, complained 
that it was still growing and that 52 percent of 
monetary transactions took place outside the banking 
system.
Legislation, committees and decrees failed to 
resolve Ukraine’s corruption problems. They 
resembled, like much else, mere declarations, not 
real policies. Charges of corruption against high- 
ranking officials were instigated only after these 
officials went over to the opposition. Pavlo 
Lazarenko was brought to Kyiv from Dnipropetrovsk 
and given two state medals by Kuchma during his 
year-long tenure as Prime Minister. After he created 
Hromada, his own anti-Kuchma political party, 
Lazarenko was threatened with arrest and in 1999
27. See Robert Kravchuk, Ukrainian Political Economy: The First 
Ten Years (New York: Palgrave/St. Martin's Press, forthcoming 
2002).
fled to the U.S., where he still resides under arrest, 
pending request for asylum. It is only common sense 
to assume that Kuchma and the SBU knew that 
Lazarenko was involved in corrupt activities but 
while he was their ally they did nothing against him.
His ally at the time, Tymoshenko, created 
Fatherland, a new anti-Kuchma party, on the ruins 
of Hromada and once she also joined the anti- 
Kuchma camp corruption charges were brought 
against her dating back to the mid 1990s with the 
help of the Russian “strategic partner”; she was 
arrested and then the charges were dropped. Her 
knowledge of the ways of corruption in the energy 
sector was the reason Yushchenko appointed her to 
be Deputy Prime Minister in 2000. She drastically 
reduced funds diverted to the oligarchs and 
increased the state budget, thereby ensuring that 
salaries and pensions could be paid. These funds 
were being diverted at the expense of Ukrainian 
citizens’ salaries and pensions by pre-Yushchenko 
Prime Ministers, with the knowledge of the 
executive and other state bodies. Not only did the 
process lead to capital accumulation by oligarchs 
and Kuchma, but it also suppressed civil society 
because the primary concern of Ukrainians became 
survival, not politics.
State, Nation-building and Religion
Over the last decade of independence Ukrainian 
elites have reached a consensus about nation­
building in regard to six areas: state- and institution­
building, borders and territorial integrity, civic 
(state) nationalism, language, national minorities and 
historiography. Consensus at the mass level is still 
far from secured. Scholars have dubbed this 
consensus the Ukrainian consociational nation­
building model, or, a creole amalgam of 
Ukrainophone-Russophone identities.28
State- and Institution-Building
Two of the three political forces in Ukraine, the 
oligarchic centrists and national democrats, support 
state- and institution-building, but the camps differ 
as to how the state should function. As the
28. See Arunas Juska, “Ethno-political Transformation in the States 
of the Former USSR,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.22, no.3 (May 
1999), 524-53 and Mykola Riabchuk, “Behind the Talks on 
‘Ukrainianization’: Laissez Faire or Affirmative Action?” in Theofil 
Kis and Iryna Makaryk, eds., Towards a New Ukraine II (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa, 2001), 135-142.
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“Kuchmagate” tapes have shown, the centrists prefer 
a non-transparent corporatist virtual state, where 
what is said is often different to what is undertaken, 
a feature reminiscent of elements of the Soviet past.29 
In contrast, the national democrats look to reforms 
that would introduce transparency, accountability 
and the rule of law.
The KPU would not accept the transformation of 
Ukraine into a gubernia within the Russian 
Federation.30 Ironically, their wish to support both 
sovereignty and a new union is similar to the 
confederation of Soviet sovereign states that national 
communists in Ukraine supported prior to 24 August 
1991. This reflects their own evolution during the 
last decade towards a Soviet Ukrainian territorial 
nationalism.
Borders and Territorial Integrity
Votes in the Rada in response to either territorial 
claims on the Crimea or against separatist tendencies 
by Crimean leaders have always been passed by 
more than two-thirds of deputies (i.e., a 
constitutional majority), which is rare in Ukrainian 
parliamentary politics. All of Ukraine’s leaders have 
always adopted a tough, non-violent line on Crimea.
Despite the volumes written on the subject by 
Western scholars and journalists, separatism has not 
manifested itself in eastern Ukraine in any manner 
whatsoever (including elections) and Russian ethnic 
nationalists have been unable to find fertile ground 
for support. In Crimea, separatism existed for a brief 
period, but rapidly disintegrated after 1995. The 
largest party on the peninsula, the communists, have 
always backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and 
were instrumental in adopting the non-separatist 
Crimean constitution in October 1998 (ratified by the 
Rada in December of that year).
After the adoption of the June 1996 Ukrainian 
Constitution, Crimean regional parties had to re­
register as either all-Ukrainian parties or as regional 
branches of existing Ukrainian parties. Support for 
separatism was further undercut after the Russian 
executive recognized Ukraine’s borders in May 
1997, a recognition ratified by the lower and upper
houses of the Russian Parliament in December 1998 
and February 1999 respectively.
Civic (State) Nationalism3’
Ukrainian independence was achieved and 
consolidated through a combination of pressure from 
the bottom up by national democrats and top down 
by national communists that continued as an alliance 
against the third camp, the KPU, who opposed 
statehood. This alliance continued until November 
2000, when “Kuchmagate” irrevocably produced a 
gulf between the oligarchic centrists and national 
democrats. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc attempts 
to bridge this gulf by being anti-oligarch but pro- 
Kuchma, positioning itself midway between 
Tymoshenko’s radical anti-Kuchma FNS and the 
oligarchs.
Since 1992 civic nationalism has evolved into a 
widespread phenomenon throughout Ukraine’s 
elites. This has occurred through the spread of the 
national idea from national democrats to the 
oligarchic centrists (where many of the former 
national communists, such as Kravchuk and 
Kuchma, ended up) and then gradually into the 
moderate left (for example, the SPU) political 
spectrum. Civic (or state) nationalist ideology is 
common to the ruling elites of all civic states, 
including Ukraine, and therefore to argue that 
nationalism is a “minority faith” in Ukraine reflects 
a lack of understanding of “banal nationalism” and 
its pervasive and central role in the modern nation- 
state.32 Ukraine’s elites have not rejected 
independence, unlike in Belarus, and coupled with 
the fact that public support for independence has 
never dropped during the last decade below two- 
thirds implies that nationalism is a “majority faith” 
in Ukraine.
Under Kuchma, the nation-building project was 
not halted, as it was under President Lukashenka in 
Belarus after 1994. Ukraine’s nation-building project 
seeks to strike a balance between the Baltic nation­
building and Belarusian nation-rejecting paths. This 
centrist path between two polar opposite projects 
thereby leads to dissatisfaction on the part of both 
national democrats (who support a more radical
29. See P. Kubicek, Unbroken Ties. The Shite, Interest Associations, 
and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000).
30. Jan Urban, “The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on 
the Eve of the 1999 Election: Similarities, Contrasts and 
Interaction,”Democratization, vol.7, no.l (1998), 111-34.
31. See T. Kuzio, “Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New 
Theoretical and Comparative Framework,” Journal of Political 
Ideologies (forthcoming, 2002).




state- and nation-building project) and pro-Russian 
forces (who support the maintenance of the inherited 
post-colonial status quo). The more abrasive 
nationality policies of the Kravchuk era were 
“pragmatized” (i.e., moderated) in the Kuchma era, 
because Russophone Ukrainians would not accept a 
radical and swift nation-building project.
Language
The language question did not influence the 
outcome of either the 1998 parliamentary or 1999 
presidential elections. There is declining support for 
Russian to become a second state language (with 
virtually no support, again except on the extreme 
left, for Russians to be a second titular nation). The 
Russian language has been removed from education 
and public life in western Ukraine, where nationality 
policies resemble those implemented in the three 
Baltic states. Elsewhere in Ukraine the Russian 
language has not become “foreign.” Ukrainianization 
of the education system has continued under 
Kuchma and spread to most regions, except the 
Donbas and Crimea.33 The proportion of school 
children instructed in Ukrainian rose from 47.9 
percent in school year 1990-91 to 62.8 percent in 
1997-98. Meanwhile, the proportion of pupils 
instructed in Russian declined from 51.4 to 31.7 
percent. In pre-schools, 25.3 percent of children are 
taught in Russian and in higher education 35 per cent 
of students are taught in Russian.34 In higher 
education the proportion of students instructed in 
Ukrainian rose from 36.8 percent (1992-93) to 51.2 
percent (1995-96).35
Reflecting the legacies of Soviet nationality 
policies referred to earlier, the Ukrainian authorities 
continue to uphold the view that the proportion of
33. See Viktor Stepanenko, The Construction of Identity and School 
Policy in Ukraine (Commack, N.Y. : Nova Science Publishers,
1999) .
34. Figures provided by Yuriy Bohuts’kyi of the Presidential 
Administration (“Russia Afraid of Ukraine’s De-Russification,” 
RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report, 15 February 2000). 1,195 
Russian-language newspapers are published in Ukraine, the 
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry pointed out, in comparison to none in 
Ukrainian for the second largest national minority of the Russian 
Federation, Ukrainians. See “Russian Language in Ukraine: 
Surrealistic Notes,” Research Update, Ukrainian Center for 
Independent Political Research, Kyiv, vol.6, no. 161 (21 February
2000) .
35. J. G. Janmaat, “Language Politics in Education and the Response
of the Russians in Ukraine,” Nationalities Papers, vol.. 27, no.3
(September 1999), 475 and 478.
pupils educated in a language should approximate 
the proportion of the corresponding ethnic group 
within the population.36 * In December 1999 the 
Constitutional Court issued a ruling that explained 
the language provisions of the 1996 Constitution 
(such as state administrators using Ukrainian) as 
applying throughout Ukrainian territory. In January 
2000 the Ukrainian Presidential Council on 
Language Policy Issues approved the government 
program “On Additional Measures to Expand the 
Use of Ukrainian as the State Language,” which 
came into effect in June of that year. It called for all 
officials to be tested for their Ukrainian language 
proficiency, for the de-Russification of the sports 
and cultural spheres and for the use of taxation to 
regulate the import of publications. In the post- 
Yushchenko era these policies are likely to be 
watered down.
Ukrainian elites have reached agreement that an 
independent state needs a state language as an 
attribute of identity, pointing to Belarus as an 
example of a country which lost its independence 
because of a weak national consciousness. Outside 
of western Ukraine, where Ukrainian is hegemonic, 
and the Donbas and the Crimea, where Russian 
remains dominant, bilingualism is growing as 
affirmative action in education and state institutions 
legitimizes and rehabilitates Ukrainian as a modern 
language.
National Minorities
Elite consensus was always in favor of the 
provision of polyethnic rights and inclusive 
citizenship, which has been backed by all political 
parties, other than the extreme right. National 
democrats have always backed the national revival 
of minorities, since their dispute was always with 
Russians who never saw themselves as a national 
minority but as a second ruling titular nation.
The Russian question is made all the more 
difficult by the fact that not all of the 12 million 
declared “Russians” from the 1989 Soviet census are 
really “ethnic Russians”; upwards of half of these 
may re-identify themselves as “Ukrainians.”
36. Vasyl’ Kremen’, Dmytro Tabachnyk and Vasyl’ Tkachenko, 
Ukraiina. Alternatyvypostupu. Krytyka istorychnoho dosvidu (Kyiv: 
Arc-Ukraine, 1996), 756-57. The January 2000 program “On 
Additional Measures to Expand the Use of Ukrainian as the State 
Language” proposes, “bringing the system of educational 
institutions into line with the ethnic composition of the population” 
(RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report, 15 February 2000).
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“Russians” in the 1989 Soviet census included not 
only ethnic Russians but also those from mixed 
marriages. “Russians” also represented a 
supranational term that included those who identified 
with the USSR (the Russian homeland was defined 
as the USSR, not the Russian SFSR, unlike in the 
non-Russian republics where two homelands 
competed for allegiances, the republics and the 
USSR).
During the mid 1990s the majority Western 
scholarly view held that Ukraine was divided into 
two antagonistic linguistic groups with different 
geopolitical orientations. Similarly, many works 
studied the Russian “diaspora” as if it were one 
united group with an allegiance to the Russian 
Federation. In reality, few had any allegiance to 
Russia and if they did it was to the non-existent 
USSR. Separatism toward Russia in eastern Ukraine 
has never manifested itself.
By the late 1990s this view was being criticized 
by a growing number of scholars for over- 
essentializing those who identified themselves as 
“Russians,” “Ukrainians” or others in the 1989 
Soviet census.37 The tendency within Western 
political science to categorize people into one group 
or another ignores the confused reality on the 
ground, particularly in a country that follows the 
“muddle way” like Ukraine. People have different 
identities that change over time and that re-prioritize 
themselves. The number of those defining 
themselves with a Soviet identity, for example, has 
declined in the Donbas during the last decade.
By categorizing Ukrainians into only two 
linguistic groups scholars claimed that Russophones 
were the largest linguistic group in Ukraine. But, this 
could only be undertaken by ignoring the fact that a 
large number of Ukrainians use both languages 
equally. If this bilingual group is taken into account, 
Russophones are the smallest of the three linguistic 
groups. This emphasis on linguistic groups also 
failed to take into account that there has never been 
any evidence of a unified Russophone community in 
Ukraine. Such a group would have to unite very 
different regional cultures spanning the Donbas, 
Odesa, Kyiv and western Ukraine.
Barrington found that attachment to a 
Russophone identity was weak in Ukraine (13 
percent) and far less popular than that for ethnicity
37. Rasma Karklins, “The Misunderstanding of Ethnicity,” Problems 
of Post-Communism, vol.. 48, no.3 (May-June 2001), 37-44.
(34 percent) and citizenship (57 percent). Russian- 
speaking Ukrainians were closer to their Ukrainian­
speaking counterparts on questions such as 
Ukrainian statehood and the small number who 
identified as Russophones. They did not constitute a 
threat to the state, because no Russophone 
conglomerate exists; mobilization along Russian 
nationalist, separatist or autonomy seeking lines has 
not occurred. More importantly, talk by some 
scholars of “linguistic faultlines” and of the 
consolidation of Ukraine into two linguistic groups 
along the lines of Belgium is not occurring.38 
Historiography
Despite concerns by some scholars that a 
“nationalist historiography” (i.e., the Hrushevs’kyi 
schema) would not be accepted by Russophones,39 
this has not materialized into conflict. The only 
criticism against current historiography has come 
from the KPU, not centrists. Janmaat and Popson 
have shown to what extent the same historiography 
is taught throughout Ukraine’s educational system, 
regardless of what language is predominately spoken 
in which region, including in the Crimea.40 41All 
shades of political opinion, except the KPU, support 
the revival of the Hrushevs’kyi historiographical 
framework. Wanner’s volume was the first in 
contemporary Ukrainian studies that sought to place 
nation-building and historiography within an 
anthropological framework that does not see 
historiography, myths and legends as unusual, but 
as commonplace policies adopted within all civic 
states.
38. Lowell Barrington, “Russian-Speakers in Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan: ‘Nationality,’ ‘Population,’ or Neither?” Post-Soviet 
Affairs, vol..17, no.2 (April-June 2001), 129-58.
39. A. Wilson, “Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine,” 
in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds., Myths & 
Nationhood (London: Hurst, 1997), 182-97.
40. Germ Janmaat, Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. 
Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking 
Population (Amsterdam: Netherlands Geographical Studies, 2000) 
and Nancy Popson, “The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing 
Children to the ‘Ukrainian Nation,’” Nationalities Papers, vol..29, 
no.2 (June 2001), 325-50. See my criticism of the continued 
dominance of Russophile historiography in “History and National 
Identity Among the Eastern Slavs. Towards a New Framework,” 
National Identities, vol. 3, no. 2 (July 2001), 109-32.
41. Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in 
Post-Soviet Ukraine. Post-Communist Cultural Studies 




Ukraine’s politics are confusing because they are 
neither fully reformist nor Soviet restorationist; they 
are unable to make a break with or effect a return to 
the Soviet past.
These muddled domestic policies undermine the 
declared strategic foreign policy goals of “returning 
to Europe,” while keeping the country as a bridge 
spanning Europe and Eurasia. Muddled domestic 
policies lead to equally muddled “multi-vector” 
foreign policies that cannot decide if Ukraine is part 
of Eurasia or Europe. Some elements of the elite 
believe that the only way to deal with this question is 
to make Ukraine’s foreign policy even more 
confusing by declaring that it will rejoin Europe only 
with Russia, a policy for never rejoining Europe.
The twin legacies of empire and totalitarianism 
have guided this path dependency during the last 
decade along a “muddle way.” This “muddle way” 
by its very nature is unstable, as it cannot resolve 
medium- or long-term problems, provide goals or 
visions, and is only premised on a narrow corporatist 
elite participating in the fruits of independence. The 
muddle way is therefore only a short-term attempt at 
outlining some elements of policy.
Growing ties to Europe, the successful transition 
examples of Central-Eastern Europe, and domestic 
transformations that will eventually lead to a more 
emboldened civil society, a more active youth and a 
middle class with a stake in private enterprise and 
private property suggests that-as in Latin 
America-the “muddle way” can be changed over 
time. Latin American and Iberian corporatism has 
evolved into democratic and market economies since 
the 1970s.
How, when and at what speed Ukraine moves 
away from its muddled path and its authoritarian 
corporatism, depends upon a factor that has been 
usually castigated by Western scholars of 
contemporary Ukraine. The choice open to post- 
Soviet states is a return to the Soviet past, as in 
Belarus by a Sovietophile regime; continue muddling 
along as in Ukraine’s first decade with oligarchs 
unclear as to where they are taking the country; or, 
following clear policies that combine civic 
nationalism and reform as in the three Baltic states. 
Yet, ironically, the first decade of Ukraine’s 
independence has shown that there was too 
little—not too much—nationalism in Ukraine, as
understood in its civic and patriotic variant.42 The 
only alternative to short-term, muddled policies that 
benefit a small oligarchic elite is a civic nationalism 
(or patriotism for those who prefer that term) that 
espouses relatively radical reform that can break 
with the Soviet past, takes the interests of the 
country to heart (and not elite clans), while driving 
the country forward domestically and externally. 
Greater civic nationalism (patriotism) would ensure 
that Ukraine’s second decade as an independent state 
would not be as muddled as its first.
Taras Kuzio’s (York University, Canada) recent 
books include Ukraine: Perestroika to 
Independence (second edition, St. Martin's Press, 
2000) and Ukraine: State and Nation Building 
(Routledge, 1998).
42. See T. Kuzio, “Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New 
Theoretical and Comparative Framework,” Journal of Political 
Ideologies (forthcoming, 2002).
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Interviews with Tengiz Sigua and Jaba Ioseliani
Dodge Billingsley
Following are interviews with Tengiz Sigua, former Georgian Prime Minister, and Jaba Ioseliani, the colorful leader of 
the controversial Mkhedrioni armed formation. Both were intimately involved in Georgia’s state-building process in the 
early 1990s. They were two-thirds of the Military Council (the remaining member, Tengiz Kitovani, now resides in 
Moscow), an interim government that replaced first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s, government. They 
were also jointly responsible for Eduard Shevardnadze’s rise to power in Georgia as well as the initiation of the conflict 
in the separatist region of Abkhazia.
Both interviews were conducted during summer 2001. At times their answers and comments are at odds with each 
other and challenge the “facts” behind the issues. However, both provide insight as to the workings of the Military 
Council, armed formations, war with Abkhazia and relations with Russia.
INTERVIEW WITH TENGIZ SIGUA
Q: Please tell us about the Military Council, who was 
involved in it and how did it operate
The Military Council was formed 2 January 1992, after 
the transfer of power from President Gamsakhurdia. It 
consisted of three persons: Tengiz Kitovani, Jaba Ioseliani 
and me. It existed until 7 March 1992, when Eduard 
Shevardnadze returned to Georgia. On 10 March 1992, 
the Military Council announced its self-dissolution and the 
State Council was formed, which functioned as a 
legislative body before the new parliament was elected. 
The head of the Council was Eduard Shevardnadze.
Q: How did Shevardnadze become a member of the 
Council?
Before Shevardnadze returned to Georgia, it was 
planned that the existing parliament be re-established. 
However, this plan did not succeed, due to a lack of 
quorum—118 members were required and only 95 
deputies appeared. As a result, while the Military Council 
still existed, the so-called “Debate Council” was formed 
under which all politicians and members of society 
gathered. All important decisions made by the temporary 
government had to be agreed upon by this Council. Soon 
after Shevardnadze’s arrival, the so-called “Debate 
Council” turned into the State Council. As it was not an 
elective body, it was not completely legitimate, but it still 
acted as one, and also as a legislative body, because the re­
establishment of the elective body—the parliament—did 
not succeed. The constituency of the Council became 
larger after Shevardnadze’s arrival. The number of
members increased from 40 to 60. Shevardnadze was 
elected head of the Council.
Q: How was the decision made to send Georgian 
military forces into Abkhazia?
In the spring of 1992, a very unpleasant series of 
events took place in Abkhazia, namely, the systematic 
robbery of railway and motor transport. The losses 
totalled nearly 12 billion Russian rubles in August 1992. 
Negotiations with Abkhaz authorities about stopping the 
robberies were attempted, but finally, on 10 August 1992, 
the State Council decided to deploy troops close to the 
Russian border, e.g., up to the Psou River. They were to 
bring the railway and motorways under control, as well as 
all engineering structures in that area.
I, as Prime Minister, was against using military forces 
in this operation. As far as I was concerned, this operation 
should have been conducted by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the police, and the armed forces of the railway. 
Those forces existed, and it was their responsibility to 
settle the situation. I believe that the Ministry of Defense 
should defend the country’s borders of the country against 
the enemy, but it is not responsible for the country’s 
internal affairs. However, the State Council made a 
decision that the Ministry of Defense had to be involved in 
this process. Consequently, the armed forces of the 
Ministry of Defense were deployed to the territory of 
Abkhazia. I was informed by telephone that this was 
agreed to by Abkhaz authorities, namely, Ardzinba, but 
then Georgian armed forces overcame armed resistance in
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Ochamchira. This incident paved the way to the armed 
conflict.
Q: Who played the biggest role in making the 
decision to enter Abkhaz territory?
The State Council, and, above all, the head of the State 
Council, Eduard Shevardnadze!
It was unanimous. Nobody was against stabilizing the 
situation, but everyone had a different approach to the 
problem. I was categorically against the involvement of 
the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense, i.e., the 
Georgian Army, in this operation. All this is recorded in 
the protocols. As a result of these robberies Georgia’s 
incurred losses of 9 billion Russian rubles, the total 
amounted to 12 billion rubles. (The attorney general of 
Armenia claimed a loss of 3 billion on goods stolen while 
being transported through Georgia.) It was crucial to 
rectify the situation, but... Once again, I say that this was 
not the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense.
Q: Please talk about the Moscow agreement signed 
on 3 September 1992, your role in it and what 
happened afterwards?
Practically speaking, the Abkhazian conflict started on 
14 August [1992]. On 3 September, negotiations were 
conducted in Moscow—the leaders of Russia, Georgia, 
Abkhazia and the North Caucasian republics were present. 
A document was issued halting operations in Abkhazia and 
negotiations were to begin immediately. In addition, joint 
commissions were formed. I was the head of the Georgian 
Commission. It was a trilateral commission: Georgian- 
Russian-Abkhazian. One of the major issues that I put 
forward was the abolition of all Abkhaz armed formations. 
None of the autonomous units of the Russian republics, 
Azerbaijan, or Central Asia, had their own armed forces 
during and after Soviet rule, they had only police or 
militia.
Here Russia demonstrated its dual character and its 
double approach. Russia considered it impossible that 
autonomous [republics] like Bashkiria, Tatarstan, 
Chechnya, Ossetia and others should have their own armed 
formations except for police, but they insisted on having 
one in Abkhazia—why?
This Russian behavior has its background. When the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union became reality Moscow 
was hard at work on how to keep the former Soviet 
republics under its control. The first plan was as follows: 
To form so-called Interfronts in those former Soviet 
republics where the percentage of Russian-speaking 
communities was high. The purpose was to gather the 
non-local population under these Interfronts and direct 
them against the local authorities. This plan was
implemented in the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia), Moldova, Ukraine, as well as in the 
Transcaucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan). Since the Russian-speaking communities in 
Georgia were very loyal to the local communities, this plan 
failed. However, those attempts were apparent in 1989- 
90.
In those republics where the Interfronts appeared to be 
unsuccessful they planned to form separatist movements, 
against the local governments, out of the local national 
minorities. Such attempts were undertaken in Southern 
Ossetia and Southern Georgia—Kvemo Kartli—that had 
compact pockets of Armenian and Azerbaijanian 
populations. This plan proved unsuccessful in Kvemo 
Kartli, but unfortunately, they made this plan work in 
Southern Ossetia and in Abkhazia. These provocations 
were directed at weakening the local government; if not by 
means of the Interfront, then by separatist movements, so 
that these republics would stay under their [Russian] 
influence.
It was an imperialistic trick. Russian nationalism was 
unable to accept the fact that the Romanov empire, which 
had expanded for 300 years, should fall apart in one day. 
Important regions, like the Baltic States, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, were starting to steadily break away. So the 
conflict in Abkhazia was part of Russia’s extensive plan. 
It was obvious from the very first days of the conflict that 
Abkhazia was supported by Russia.
Q: What happened afterwards?
The Georgian side made several mistakes. First of all, 
the decision of the State Council, which required this 
operation to be finished in two days, should have been 
fulfilled. On 14 August 1992, the operation should have 
started and, on 16 August, our armed forces and police 
were supposed to be at the Georgian-Russian border, that 
is, at the Psou River to take control of the railway, 
motorway, and engineering structures such as aqueducts 
and so on. But, suddenly, on 15 August our troops were 
stopped in Sukhumi by Shevardnadze’s order. At that time 
our formations were already past the Gumista River and 
were ready to carry out their plan.
Shevardnadze’s decision was not agreed upon by any 
member of the Council—neither with me nor with 
Kitovani or Ioseliani. The presidium of the State Council 
consisted of four members and, according to the rales, 
none of them had a right to make an independent decision. 
Moreover, if even one of us disagreed on a certain issue, 
he had a right to impose a veto. But, Shevardnadze gave 
the order to the commander of our armed formations to 
stop in Sukhumi, and this was a very big mistake.
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Shevardnadze also allowed the Russian Defense 
Minister to deploy troops from Azerbaijan to Abkhaz 
territory, in Gudauta, and suddenly they appeared in our 
rear. It was the famous assault landing regiment #345, 
based in Ganja, Azerbaijan. Again, we did not agree with 
Shevardnadze regarding this decision. I asked him why he 
had allowed the Russian Defense Ministry to deploy an 
entire regiment from another country—the Soviet Union 
had already disintegrated and nobody had the right to 
move armed forces into Georgia. This issue was not 
ratified by the State Council nor its Presidium. 
Shevardnadze answered that he was afraid the Abkhaz 
would attack the Russian military base in Gudauta to 
capture weapons. This was not a valid argument. The 
Russian base in Gudauta is highly fortified, not even a bird 
can fly in. Who would dare take arms from there by 
force? The assault landing regiment #345 was the 
strongest armed detachment, and showed the strongest 
resistance to Georgian armed forces. Allowing it into 
Georgia was a big mistake.
After signing the agreement on 3 September 1992, we 
expected that the situation would settle down, but 
following the instructions given the Abkhaz by the 
Russians, the Abkhaz broke all the agreements, and this 
process continues. More than 40 documents were signed 
unilaterally as well as internationally..., but none of the 
documents had any positive impact. I personally think that 
the Georgian side is very tolerant of Russia. It is obvious 
that Russia played a negative role in the Georgian- 
Abkhazian conflict, and now Russia is a “peacekeeper” in 
Abkhazia... This is unacceptable when it is possible to 
have normal peacekeeping forces led by the UN or EU 
which can carry out their mission correctly. During the 
past seven years Russian peacekeepers “brilliantly” 
performed one of their duties—they fixed the border 
between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia on the Inguri 
River. That is absolutely unacceptable for me and for the 
majority of Georgian society.
Another big mistake was made in July 1993 by signing 
the agreement by which peace was supposed to be brought 
about. As a result of this agreement, all military hardware 
was withdrawn from Sukhumi. This document should not 
have been signed, because 10 previous agreements had 
been violated... In early September of 1993 all military 
hardware was withdrawn from Sukhumi to Poti, but the 
Abkhaz side moved their heavy weapons less than 25 km 
from Sukhumi, so that in case of emergency they could 
bring them to Sukhumi in just 30 minutes. That was 
exactly what happened. On 16 September 1993, that 
agreement was also violated and massive attacks were 
launched against Sukhumi. Sukhumi fell on 27 September.
Two days later Abkhazia was no longer under Georgian 
jurisdiction.
Q: What can you tell us about civil and military 
relations during the conflict?
I can show you a document that makes it clear that 
Shevardnadze tried to make the Ministry of Defense 
responsible for everything... As I told you before, it was 
my position that the Ministry of Defense should not have 
taken part in this operation. It was an internal affair. I can 
show you the protocols of the Council where you’ll see 
that Shevardnadze made all the decisions. It is not a 
secret; it was published. The problem is that 
Shevardnadze might say one thing today, but say the 
opposite tomorrow. He sometimes forgets things. He 
forgot that it was already documented. My opposing 
opinion is recorded.
A meeting was held at the State Council on 11 August. 
Shevardnadze’s and my speeches are recorded where I am 
categorically against the Army’s involvement. Moreover, 
this operation was supposed to start on 19 or 20 August, 
but Shevardnadze mentioned in his speech that he had 
asked our armed forces to accelerate this process. So, the 
operation began on 14 August instead of 19 August. It is 
documented.
He usually says that we should not have entered 
Sukhumi. But the road does not go around Sukhumi. It is 
impossible to reach the Psou River unless you go straight 
through Sukhumi. I cannot blame it on poor knowledge of 
geography. It was a provocative action.
The Military Council ordered the police to begin the 
operation.on 14 August, and reach the Psou River on 16 
August, form three camps, and control the railway and 
highway. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze said that they should 
not enter Sukhumi. Was the army supposed to walk over 
the Caucasus mountains?! It is absurd! All these facts 
have been exposed. It is not true when Shevardnadze says 
that the soldiers did not obey him. He made all the 
decisions. It was his decision to begin the operation, to 
stop the armed formations, and to move the Russian 
detachments from Azerbaijan to Georgia. It was his 
decision not to launch a counter attack on 16 March 1993, 
when the Abkhaz detachments were demoralized. It was 
his decision to sign the agreement of 27 June 1993, 
requiring the removal of armed detachments from 
Sukhumi. There was an open fight in Parliament about 
this issue—that the agreement should not have been 
signed. But Shevardnadze took this responsibility. He 




Q: In your opinion, what was the reason for the loss?
My personal opinion is that the operation planned by 
the Military Council had to be carried out by all means but 
in different terms. Second, the State Council was an 
executive body in Georgia and nobody had the right to 
ignore its resolutions. It was a misstep when 
Shevardnadze stopped the armed forces in Sukhumi as 
there was no sign of resistance from the Abkhaz side at 
that time.
The most important matter was that the Russian 
parliament—the Duma—was on vacation during August. 
The Russian generals were unable to make any serious 
political decision, such as to put up a resistance to 
Georgian forces. Our police passed Ochamchira and 
Sukhumi without encountering any problems. Even 
though there was a powerful Russian Ministry of Defense 
base in Ochamchira, they did not nothing, because they 
had not received any orders. It means that no political 
decision had yet been made in Moscow. There was a very 
strong regiment in Sukhumi, near the Shukura quarter, but 
they did not do anything to stop the advance of Georgian 
forces. The first attack was carried out by the Abkhaz 
Guard. This Guard did not have enough power, weapons, 
or even fighters, to put up a strong resistance.
Stopping the Army in Sukhumi on 15 August 1992 was 
a big mistake which caused the conflict to drag on for two 
years and eventually led to a serious loss. If Georgian 
troops had been given the chance to carry out this mission, 
as charged by the State Council, reach the Psou River and 
take control of the territory on 16 August, I am sure that 
Russia would not have been able to turn its provocative act 
into the war. Stopping the troops in Sukhumi gave the 
Russian-Abkhaz side a chance to gain power. They formed 
a headquarters and began receiving military supplies from 
Russia ten to twelve days later. A political decision was 
made in Moscow to support the Abkhaz side, and military 
operations were launched against Georgia.
When our anti-aircraft forces shot down a Russian SU- 
27 ground attack aircraft, the pilot appeared to have a map 
proving that he was given a special mission in Rostov to 
fly to Georgia. This aircraft was sent by the Russian 
Ministry of Defense. It did not come from the Abkhaz.
Captured Russian spies who took part in operations in 
Sukhumi admitted that they were Russian army officers 
collecting military information for the Abkhaz. There is 
no need to question Russia’s actions. There is a simple 
answer: Russia acted according to its political decision—to 
separate Abkhazia from Georgia for some period, which 
would force Georgia to become their slave, as it had been 
for many decades.
Q: It was said that war supplies were stopped in 
Samegrelo. What can you tell us about that?
Two or three times military supplies were sent from 
Tbilisi, but the army received canned food in the boxes 
instead. This was subversive activity against the Georgian 
Army. Moreover, whenever the Georgian Police and 
Army entered settlements to bring it within Georgian 
jurisdiction, they received orders from Tbilisi to leave the 
area. For example, Tkvarcheli. What military strategist 
would leave the enemy in his rear? Tkvarcheli is east of 
Sukhumi and they were in Sukhumi while Tkvarcheli was 
in enemy hands. General Gudja Kurashvili wrote that he 
had a chance to enter Tkvarcheli peacefully three times 
without firing a shot, but an order came from Tbilisi not to 
enter Tkvarcheli. Tkvarcheli played an important role in 
the last powerful attack that caused the loss of Abkhazia. 
There were two fronts, one in Sukhumi and another, 
behind us, the Tkvarcheli-Ochamchira front.
Q: What is the future for Abkhazia?
We have to keep Abkhazia’s statute of autonomy with 
the same rights that it possessed before the conflict. The 
Soviet Union consisted of 15 republics, four of 
them—Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan—had 
autonomous units. All the other republics were unitary 
states. No autonomous units existed on their territories. 
The autonomous units in the four republics were 
artificially created by the Communist Party. Since they 
already exist, the authorities have no right to abolish them 
unless the people decide to do so. That is why Abkhazia 
has to remain autonomous. Even during Soviet times they 
had their own independent university and TV broadcasting 
in the Abkhaz language. Neither Tatarstan nor Bashkiria 
had such advantages.
During the Soviet period, and even afterwards, Georgia 
was very tolerant toward the Abkhaz. The idea that the 
Abkhaz were being oppressed is not true. If you consider 
the situation in the other Soviet autonomies you’ll see that 
it is an absolutely false argument that the Abkhaz were 
kept down. On the other hand, it is ancient Georgian land. 
If you are a national minority here and do not accept the 
priorities of the country, do not respect its flag,- hymn and 
language, you cannot be a citizen of this country. Such 
people should go to their own country. But the Abkhaz do 
not have an independent homeland and that is why we 
cannot tell them to go home. They also are inhabitants of 
this old land, which is now called Abkhazia. In this case 
they should respect the priorities of the country as set forth 
by the international community, i.e., flag, language and 




As a matter of fact, according to the opinion of the 
international community, the problem of national 
minorities is considered the second most important issue. 
However, this should not exclude the most important 
issue—respect for and inviolability of existent state 
borders. Everyone with separatist intentions, and all 
separatist groups, should accept the idea that they are 
incapable of reaching their goals in today’s world.
INTERVIEW WITH JABA IOSELIANI
Interview conducted on May 25, 2001, at his home in Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia
Q: Tell us about the Mkhedrioni
In 1988, when it was obvious that the USSR was 
disintegrating, there were ethnic clashes in the Bolnisi 
and Marneuli regions. At that time Georgian forces were 
not armed. Nobody had any idea how or who could 
protect the country. At the same time, some political 
parties were created and rallies were being held. The 
police was disarmed as Moscow completely removed its 
armament, and of course we had the Russian Army here. 
I have had experience in life. I even had some weapons 
at home. So young people gathered around me. We 
heard that there were hostilities against Georgians in 
Marneuli [an Azeri enclave] so about 50 of us went there. 
We did not attack or use force. We just regulated the 
situation. The government tried to remain neutral during 
the hostilities and not to intervene in the conflicts. 
Everybody was psychologically prepared for the collapse 
of the country, but still nobody dared to act against, not 
even the police. Soon events occurred in [South] Ossetia. 
A group of 40,000 people went to organize a rally in 
Tskhinvali [capital of South Ossetia] and we joined them 
there. We were not called Mkhedrioni at this time; 
everybody called us “Jaba’s boys.”
Q: Was the name Mkhedrioni being used at that 
time?
As I said it was called “Jaba’s Boys,” because they 
followed me and they all were young. After the rally [in 
Tskhinvali] we heard that Ossetians began to attack 
Georgians in Tskhinvali. We entered the city immediately 
and took 100 Ossetians captive. It was a small battle, 
only one of our fighters and two civilians were wounded. 
We had been billeted in different villages and they 
entered the villages by bus, shooting around. We shot 
their wheels and took 100 prisoners. They were shocked 
that there were only six of us. We talked and discussed 
the situation for two days and departed on good terms. 
The government tried to intervene but we did not let 
them. We settled the situation and left. But 
Gamsakhurdia’s people started to create an atmosphere of 
conflict in South Ossetia, by taking Ossetians captive 
soon after. So, we had to return and stabilize the 
situation. The Ossetians begun to trust us. They could 
see that we were armed but at the same time we were 
something like a peace mission, which tried to reconcile 
them. But Gamsakhurdia’s political branch became more 
provocative. They started to persecute Ossetians in 
Tbilisi, Borjomi, Bakuriani, but not in Tskhinvali.
[By the time the war started in Abkhazia in 1992] the 
number of our soldiers was already 2000-3000, and 
serious people joined us, for example, Merab Alexidze, 
an academician and Director of the Institute of 
Geophysics. So it was becoming awkward to be referred 
to as “Jaba’s Boys.” We decided to form a traditional 
military structure and call it Mkhedrioni.
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Jaba Ioseliani, seated second from left. Abkhazia, 1992. Copyright © Georgian State Information Service.
Q: Was Mkhedrioni basically formed out of 
acquaintances and friends?
It consisted of acquaintances as well as strangers. I 
was popular among young people, so they came to me. 
They saw something romantic or patriotic in it. The 
experiences we had together in Mameuli and Bolnisi kind 
of united us.
Mkhedrioni had units in several regions and towns of 
Georgia, for example, Bolnisi, Kutaisi, Samtredia and so 
on. Each of them had their own commander... More 
important, our forces were formed on a voluntary basis. 
We did not ask anybody to join us and fight. We just 
announced that we were going. Anybody could join us if 
they chose.
We had our Council of War consisting of 12 to 18 
members. It included a Political Council, consisting of 2 
or 3 persons; I was chairman of this Council of War. 
Members of the Council and unit commanders rotated 
among Mkhedrioni members, depending on who was best 
qualified to carry out the operation. The unit 
commanders were often replaced. For example, 
sometimes the villagers were brave and good fighters, but
they were not good city fighters. On the other hand, a 
fighter from the city was able to be more flexible and 
practical, so he would become a commander. We don’t 
have any trained soldiers. We were defined by the talent 
and skills of our fighters.
Q: Did your Mkhedrioni include any military 
specialists?
Yes of course, we had several, but they did not get 
along with us. They were often easily confused... They 
usually were given special assignments, such as dealing 
with armaments.
In Ochamchira [during the war in Abkhazia 1992- 
1993] the [National] Guard, Army and Mkhedrioni fought 
together. The new commander of the Army, Lieutenant 
General Kamkamidze, had graduated from military 
academy and fought in Afghanistan, he had combat 
experience. We were planning an operation and he had 
to meet with the Mkhedrioni. He was surprised at the 
way our fighters were dressed, some in coats, some in 
Nabadi [traditional, non-woven coat, made of wool, 
mostly worn by people in the mountains] and how relaxed
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they were. But after some time he admitted that they 
were real fighters. I’ll tell you one story.
The Ministry of Defense sent us troops. We happened 
to meet them on the way while we were examining the 
positions. They wore uniforms and helmets and looked 
like a real army. One of our fighters said that he envied 
them as a result.
We had launched an attack in one village, Merkula, 
and occupied half of it. We were planning to occupy the 
other half but it got dark. We decided to stop and let the 
Army stand guard at night, as we were very tired from 
fighting. We wanted to rest and continue our operation in 
the morning. I returned to the headquarters and while I 
took off my bulletproof vest, I heard some noise. The 
army had abandoned their positions and run away. The 
boy who had envied them (he was wearing a lady’s coat) 
chased after them. What I want to say is this; special 
training, discipline and a uniform does not a soldier make, 
if one is not a fighter in his heart.
Q: What can you tell us about the discipline in 
Mkhedrioni?
The Abkhaz can prove that we never abandoned our 
positions. Although they call us bandits they cannot say 
that Mkhedrioni abandoned its positions. We lost the war 
but have never left one another. Friendship, brotherhood, 
respect and love for one another has kept us united.
Q: Was Mkhedrioni renewed with the name of 
rescue corps?
In 1991, when civil war broke out [with President 
Gamsakhurdia], we were basically the leading forces 
there, because half of the [National] Guard was on 
Gamsakhurdia’s side. Due to events in Samegrelo and 
war in Abkhazia, we did not have time to officially 
register, but it became necessary in the end.
The way Shevardnadze acted at that time makes me 
think that either he was not sensible enough or he was a 
provocateur. During the war in Abkhazia, when we were 
the leading military force of Georgia, he intended to 
attack our unit of 200 fighters in Rustavi. Of course we 
would have defended ourselves, and who knows how it 
would have ended. Both Shevardnadze and 
Gamsakhurdia showed such intentions several times.
We’ve experienced two kinds of dictatorial power. 
The first was Gamsakhurdia, who considered us his worst 
enemies, because we were against his authoritarian rule 
and dictatorship. That’s why he tried to get rid of us. 
The second was Shevardnadze. In the beginning he 
supported us, but once he started to establish his authority 
and dictatorship he did the same. I call this dictatorship. 
He started to establish his authority by removing
everyone, from a cleaner to Prime Minister, and intervene 
in the economy and many other fields. Dictatorship does, 
not necessarily mean that he has to arrest everyone or 
drink blood. His actions already made him a dictator.
It might sound exaggerated, but we were the army of 
freedom, which was unacceptable for governmental 
structures, because they consisted of the same people that 
were in the Soviet government—the same Communist 
way of working, based on corruption and “robbery”. We 
were against it, but of course, we were not allowed to be 
formally registered. They used to complain that 
Mkhedrioni members were walking around with 
weapons. What else were we supposed to do during the 
civil war and intervention?
On the other hand, we were not angels. It is 
impossible that all 8000 fighters were perfect. Today I 
heard about an accident that three men took alcohol by 
force from a booth, claiming that they were Mkhedrioni 
members... Two or three members of Mkhedrioni might 
have done this kind of thing, but the Russians robbed 
Europe and they were called liberators. We could hold 
them and settle this problem by ourselves, but 
Shevardnadze and his Communist team took advantage of 
it, and wrote about us in every newspaper and magazine. 
During my trial I said that we could not stay calm in the 
face of conflict and civil war.
Q: Have you ever expelled a member from 
Mkhedrioni?
Not only expelled, we disbanded the Mkhedrioni unit 
of Khashuri because they were committing robberies. 
After making sure of it, we shot them in the legs and they 
are now handicapped. We did not have them arrested; we 
did not want to publicize their actions. We also used to 
expel drug addicts, except those who were our old 
friends, but we constantly agitated against drug-taking. 
We never accepted drug addicts. Everybody blamed us 
for it, but it is not true.
Q: Can you tell us about entering Abkhazia?
I was against entering Abkhazia. I knew it would 
prove fatal because Russia had a hand in it. I had brought 
up the question about our relations with Russia several 
times in Parliament. Some issues had to be agreed to with 
Russia before entering Abkhazia. But Shevardnadze 
thought he could manage this problem by deceiving 
Russia. He can be cunning sometimes but he cannot 
deceive the whole country. I, personally, and the 
Mkhedrioni were against starting the war. Do you think 
that they were striving to fight and die? They just wanted 




Q: As I understand it, the decision to enter 
Abkhazia should have been made after reaching a 
consensus, and you were the member of the State 
Council and had the right to vote.
I was a member of the presidium and had a right to 
vote, but at that time Shevardnadze was the president. Do 
not believe that we went there to fight. Our plan was to 
control the railway and at the same time, demonstrate our 
strength, or flex our muscles, to the Abkhaz. The 
situation worsened when Abkhazia declared itself a 
republic, and they elected a parliament that consisted of 
28 Abkhaz and 26 Georgian parliamentarians, while the 
Georgian population was three times larger than that of 
the Abkhaz. Gamsakhurdia supported this. Most 
important, the Zviadists [followers of ex-president Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia] blocked the Zugdidi railway and robbed 
the trains.
Mkhedrioni was not responsible for control of the 
railway, this had to be done by the army and police, but 
Kitovani did not fulfill his mission. The Russians 
delivered him heavy weapons and he sent the army but he 
personally went to Kutaisi. At that time Ardzinba 
[current president of Abkhazia] formed a guard of 200 
people, similar to Mkhedrioni. Shevardnadze and 
Ardzinba agreed to control the railway together with 
Kitovani’s army. Kitovani was supposed to meet 
Ardzinba to agree on the details, but Kitovani went to 
Kutaisi.
Q: The army did not have a leader on this expedition?
That is correct. When they went to Okhurei [a village 
close to Ochamchira], the Abkhaz opened fire and 500 
policemen retreated from their positions. In spite of this, 
the National Guard reached Sukhumi but was stopped 
near the Red Bridge and was unable to enter the city. 
Shevardnadze called me and asked the whereabouts of 
Kitovani. He was very concerned and even supposed that 
Kitovani may have committed suicide. This made me 
laugh, but we could not find him for two days. Finally, 
we found him in the Tskhaltubo Military Sanatorium. 
Meanwhile, the situation in Abkhazia worsened. I was 
respected there and decided to talk to Labakhua and 
Ankvabi [Abkhaz officials]. We agreed to stabilize the 
situation together. I could stabilize the situation in 
Sukhumi.
I, together with [Tengiz] Sigua, went to Sukhumi 
where we met Kitovani. We planned to negotiate with 
Ardzinba, but it was impossible to meet him, so we 
negotiated with Ankvabi and others. However they were 
unable to make any decision without Ardzinba.
Q: Did the National Guard manage to deploy troops 
in Sukhumi by this time?
No, they were still near the Red Bridge, where the 
situation began to deteriorate and serious clashes took 
place. I asked Kitovani not to retaliate but he was sure he 
could easily defeat them. Meanwhile, Labakhua [Abkhaz 
official] kept calling, complaining that in spite of our 
agreement Kitovani was still attacking. I assured him that 
I would stop the attacks. I talked to Kitovani one more 
time but unsuccessfully, he was anxious to attack 
Sukhumi.
Kitovani, as Defense Minister and a Member of 
Parliament, was the main figure there and did not 
consider my suggestion not to enter Sukhumi. I knew it 
would have a fatal end, so (Tengiz) Sigua and I returned, 
Kitovani was supposed to stay. The next morning 
Kitovani surprisingly appeared during our meeting with 
Shevardnadze. He was holding an [Abkhaz] flag. (He 
treated that flag as if it had come from the Reichstag.) He 
had entered Sukhumi and occupied the government 
building, but could not go further. The Abkhaz had 
“disarmed” the Russians at their military base near the 
Gumista River, but in reality the Russians let them take 
2000 guns. They were able to put up a defensive at the 
Gumista River. I was forced into the war two or three 
days later.
Q: Was the problem the result of political 
interference or in the lack of cooperation between 
military units?
Both! Shevardnadze was unable to control the 
situation. He mainly concentrated on keeping his power 
over us. He even tried to get rid of Kitovani and myself. 
For that reason he intended to start a dispute between 
[Kitovani and Karkarashvili] by making Gia 
Karkarashvili a General, although he lost Gagra. We 
were very close to Tkvarcheli, about one and a half 
kilometers, but there were just 200-300 of us and we did 
not dare attack a town of 18,000 people. According to the 
plan, we were to unite with 1000 of Karkarashvili’s men, 
but he did not appear. He was in Sukhumi, and instead of 
coming to Tkvarcheli he went to Tbilisi where 
Shevardnadze appointed him to the position of Defense 
Minister.
Q: A lot of formations existed, but they never 
united?
Ambitions. Once I formed Mkhedrioni, Noda Natadze 
became ambitious to form his own formation called Imedi 
(hope). Why should Natadze do this when he is afraid to 




We, Mkhedrioni, gathered in Martkhopi and 
demanded that all formations unite. I was ready to 
rename the Mkhedrioni and call it the Georgian Army. 
The boys were against this, but I insisted that the 
existence of two parallel formations always results in war. 
The commander of Imedi, David Khomasuridze, was 
against uniting with us. Apparently, Nodar Natadze 
insisted that Imedi remain independent, but we forced 
them to join us. Soon after, Natadze visited me and we 
again argued this matter. He feared that if Russia 
attacked us they would be able to destroy our entire force 
in one blow. I told him not to talk nonsense and made 
him leave my house. Everyone knows about the meeting 
in Martkhopi, when we demanded that all the formations 
unite. That was the reason for our hunger strike. I was 
against Gamsakhurdia’s plan to form a [National] Guard 
in November as the war [in South Ossetia] was already 
started and we were there, ready to fight.
Q: It is understandable why this did not happen 
during Gamsakhurdia’s presidency, but what was 
the reason that all the formations did not unite 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense in 1992- 
1994?
The reason was Shevardnadze’s incorrect approach to 
the problems. I am not exaggerating. I, Jaba Ioseliani, let 
him have my chair [in the Military Council] and even 
became his deputy. It was my initiative to bring 
Shevardnadze to Georgia. Sigua and Kitovani were 
against it. However, they did not loose anything. They 
both remained in their positions of Prime Minister and 
Defense Minister respectively. Why should he not trust 
me? Even before arriving from Moscow, in an interview 
in Der Spiegel magazine, he stated that he planned to 
remove Kitovani and me. Shevardnadze’s main objective 
has always been to create a web of intrigue. He is a 
careerist. He had the same goals when he was Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He 
always puts his career first.
Dodge Billingsley has been engaged in security research 
in the Caucasus since 1993. He has worked on defense- 
related films for the History Channel and the Discovery 
Channel. Billingsley is the producer and director of the 
film “Immortal Fortress: A Look Inside Chechnya's 
Warrior Culture, ” which was awarded the 1999 Bronze 
Plaque.
31
